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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 Aim of the study and applied approach 
 
This study presents estimates of the effective levels of company taxation in the 
15 Member States of the EU. The study is established from the perspective of a 
multinational investor and provides relevant qualitative and quantitative 
information about the company tax regimes in the EU Member States which are 
in force in 2001. 
 
The main aim of the study is to compute and to compare effective marginal tax 
rates (EMTR) on domestic investment in all 15 EU Member States. A secondary 
aim is to work out the impact of the different tax drivers on the effective tax 
burden, i.e. to analyse how the EMTRs of the Member States are influenced by 
the tax systems, the different types of profit and non-profit taxes, the tax bases 
and the tax rates. The computation of the EMTR and the quantitative analysis is 
based on the well known approach of King and Fullerton which is also used, for 
example, in international tax burden comparison by the OECD and the European 
Commission. We refer to a typical manufacturing company as a base case. This 
company – which has the legal structure of a corporation – is characterised by a 
particular combination of investments and forms of finance. We considered five 
different types of investment: intangibles, industrial buildings, machinery, financial 
assets and inventories. The financing policy considered three sources of finance: 
new equity capital, retained earnings and debt. 
 
 The calculations take into account the most relevant tax provisions. Relating to 
company taxation, we considered the corporation tax, additional profit taxes and 
non-profit taxes, the tax rates and the most relevant aspects of the tax base. Chapter 
B presents a brief and well structured overview on the company tax regimes in 
the EU Member States. 
 
 Overview on results  
 
The results are signalling a great variation between the EMTR in the EU Member 
States. For our base case manufacturing company we compute an overall EU-
average EMTR of 18.13%. This figure appears to be relatively low. But since debt-
financing in addition to equity-financing is considered, a relatively high amount of 
tax savings can be attributed to interest deduction by the company. There are 
several countries that come out well above or below this average. The range is 
wide. Indeed, the average EMTR per individual country ranges from 6.76% 
(Greece) to 30.11% (France). Alternative assumptions about the structure of 
investment as well as the financing policy can result in even larger differences. 
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 More than by anything else the ranking is influenced by differences between the 
statutory tax rates on profits, i.e. the rates of corporation tax including local profit 
taxes and surcharges. It is striking that the two countries (Germany and 
Luxembourg) with the highest statutory tax rates on profits also belong to the group 
with the highest overall EMTR. It is also interesting to note that Sweden, Finland, 
and Ireland, which have the lowest statutory tax rates on profits, are all among the 
five countries with the lowest EMTR. We refer to Table C.4. 
 
A comparison of the aggregate profit tax rates and the EMTR for each country – we 
refer to Table C.6 – unveils another interesting aspect. It appears that for all 
countries except four (Austria, France, Greece and Italy) the average EMTR for 
retained earnings and new equity varies only a few percentage points from the 
statutory tax rate on profits. This leads to the conclusion that in a normal case (i.e. 
not taking into account special investment incentives) the composition of the tax 
base does not have a great impact on the effective tax burden. The level of the tax 
rate is the truly important factor for the difference in tax burden. 
 
However, with respect to the situations in Austria, France, Greece and Italy, this 
statement cannot be generally applied to all Member States. France levies a high 
portion of non-profit taxes which considerably increase the effective tax burden. 
Austria and Italy apply a so-called concept of dual income taxation which explicitly 
favours equity financing. Greece applies a significantly lower tax rate on 
investment income. Therefore, in Austria, Greece and Italy, the effective tax burden 
is considerably lower than the statutory tax rate on profits. 
 
Taxation of company finance 
 
From the point of view of the corporation our calculations clearly indicate that 
the most tax-efficient method of finance is debt rather than retained earnings or 
new capital. We also conclude that the debt-equity ratio, and hence the weight of 
debt in the source of finance, has a significant influence on the effective tax burden. 
On the other hand, distribution policy has no impact on the EMTR at the level of 
the corporation due to equal treatment of distributed profits and retained earnings. 
We refer to Table C.10. 
 
However, we did not consider taxation on profit repatriation such as withholding 
taxes on dividends and interest and the method for eliminating international double 
taxation on dividends. These considerations certainly depend on individual 
circumstances, such as the relevant tax provisions of the home country of the parent 
company and the provisions of the tax treaty between the host country of the EU-
subsidiary and home country of the parent. 
 
Taxation of company investment / assets 
 
With respect to depreciable assets the relative taxation of either intangibles or 
machinery is more generous than the taxation of buildings. A notable exception 
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is Greece, where buildings are depreciated over periods of 10 years only. 
Intangibles are treated most favourably in Denmark, where an immediate write-
off is permitted. A sensitivity analysis of the relative weight of the assets as a 
percentage of balance sheet total leads to the conclusion that the impact of a 
different capital intensity is, on average, not great. We refer to Table C.9. 
 
Sensitivity of results with respect to profitability and personnel intensity 
 
The rate of return and thus the profitability of an investment is determinative for 
the results. Beyond some level of pre-tax return (about 10%) the EMTR is not 
greatly affected by any further changes in the pre-tax return. Below that level the 
results are significantly affected by differences in pre-tax return, particularly in 
the range below 6%. This leads to important changes in the relative EMTRs. 
Indeed, the spread between the highest and lowest EMTR across Member States 
falls from 54 percentage points for a pre-tax return of 3% to 19 percentage 
points for a pre-tax return of 15%. The EU-average falls from 19.23% to 
18.32%. We refer to Table C.7. The considerable variation between the EMTR 
of the EU Member States in the case of a low profitability is to a great extent 
attributable to the levy of non-profit taxes. 
 
Austria and France raise taxes which are increasing if the labour costs increase. 
Thus, a fair comparison of the EMTR requires that the costs of labour are included. 
In particular, the French rules are far from ideal from an economic point of view. 
With regard to “taxe professionnelle” and employer taxes both capital- and labour-
intensive industries currently bear high tax burdens. However, the French 
government has announced to abolish payroll from the base of the “taxe 
professionnelle” until the year 2003. This would result in a significant reduction of 
the French tax burden. 
 
Effective Tax Burdens for different industries 
 
Since the effects of the weights of the types of investment, the sources of finance 
and the personnel intensity on the effective tax burden are not the same in each 
country, the EMTR were recalculated for 12 other industries in addition to our base 
case manufacturing company. We refer to Table C.11. The levels of the EMTRs 
and the variations between EMTRs across countries clearly depend on the specific 
industry. In this respect, the capital intensity, the debt-equity ratio and the personnel 
intensity are important factors. However, except for Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Finland, there are only minor changes in the country ranking from the highest to the 
lowest EMTR for different industries. Therefore, the base case makes a good 
assumption about the country ranking of the EMTRs. 
 
Effects of tax reforms between 1998 and 2001 
 
The final Section summarises the main tax reforms and their consequences for the 
effective levels of company taxation since 1998. The dominant trend in the tax 
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reforms has been a lowering of the tax rates on profits. This has been seen in eight 
out of 15 EU Member States. However, this lowering of the tax rates was combined 
with a broadening of the tax bases, in particular with a cut back of the depreciation 
rules. In addition, many Member States have changed their corporation tax systems. 
There is an obvious trend away from imputation systems towards shareholder relief 
systems which, however, reduce relief for corporation tax to domestic shareholders. 
The reduced relief for corporation tax also compensates for revenue losses 
attributable to the tax rate reductions. Since the changes of the corporation tax 
systems only burden resident tax payers, this trend clearly indicates that Member 
States try to strengthen the international competitiveness of their tax systems. 
 
As a consequence of the tax reforms, the EU-average EMTR has fallen from 
19.91% in 1998 to 18.13% in 2001. We refer to Table C.13. However, the effects 
on the country ranking from the highest to the lowest EMTR were only minor. 
Except Austria, Ireland and Portugal, no country could improve its position. In 
particular those Member States which did not reduce their tax burden or even 
increased it moderately, have lost some positions in the country ranking. The most 
striking result is, that countries on top of the ranking (Finland, Greece, Italy and 
Sweden) as well as at the bottom of the ranking (France and Germany) remained 
the same. From a quantitative point of view, only the Irish tax reforms caused major 
changes. The Irish EMTR has fallen from 20.59% in 1998 to 9.43 in 2001 respect 
already given to 12.5% corporation tax rate which will become effective from 
2003. Since other countries with relatively low EMTRs did not further reduce their 
tax burdens, there is, however, no so-called race to the bottom. 
 
 Final conclusions 
 
 Tax regimes are designed as a whole. From the perspective of a multinational 
investor, the most important elements of a tax regime constituting the effective tax 
burden are the tax rate, the tax base and additional (local) taxes profit and non-
profit taxes. From these three elements, the tax rate on profits has in general the 
highest impact on the level of effective tax burden. However, the tax rate on profits 
alone cannot explain the country ranking with respect to the effective tax burden in 
any case. There are several exceptions from this general rule. The most important 
exceptions are a relatively high level of non-profit taxes, for example in France, 
special (low) tax rates for certain types of corporate income, for example in Greece, 
special concepts for company taxation, for example the concepts of "dual income 
taxation" in Austria and Italy which favour equity capital against debt-financing, or 
local profit taxes which limit interest deductibility, for example the trade tax in 
Germany. 
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CHAPTER A 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I. AIM OF THE STUDY 
 
With the formal establishment of the European Union’s single market in 1992 
and the third stage of the European Money Union (EMU) in 1999 many 
regulatory and economic barriers for doing business in the European Union 
(EU) have been removed. Yet, competition in the EU is still strongly distorted 
by the tax regimes of the EU Member States, since taxation is neither co-
ordinated or even harmonised within the EU. Therefore, a multinational investor 
who plans to establish or restructure his business in the EU has to analyse and 
manage 15 independent European tax regimes as well as their complex 
interactions with his own tax system. Since other important economic and legal 
conditions within the EU have been harmonised more and more it is not 
surprising that discussions on the economics of one business location as against 
another in the EU quickly turn to the comparative tax burdens. 
 
This study presents estimates of the effective levels of company taxation in the 
15 Member States of the EU. The study is established from the perspective of a 
multinational investor and provides relevant qualitative and quantitative 
information about the company tax regimes in the EU Member States and their 
effects on the decision making of multinationals such as, for example, location 
and financing decisions. The study uses information about the tax regimes which 
are in force in 2001. 
 
The main aim of the study is to compute and to compare effective marginal tax 
rates (EMTR) on domestic investment in all 15 EU Member States. The 
computation of the EMTR and the quantitative analysis is based on the well 
known approach of King and Fullerton (1984). The most important studies by 
the OECD (1991) and the European Commission (in the Ruding Report of 1992) 
in the last decade as well as an earlier report prepared by Baker & McKenzie in 
co-operation with the University of Mannheim (1999) on behalf of the Dutch 
Ministry of Finance applied the same methodology. A secondary aim of this 
study is to work out the impact of the different tax drivers on the effective tax 
burden. This means we want to elaborate for specific situations how the 
effective tax burdens of companies in the EU Member States are influenced by 
the tax systems, the different types of profit and non-profit taxes, the tax bases 
and the tax rates. 
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II. PERSPECTIVE OF A MULTINATIONAL INVESTOR AND THE ROLE 
OF PERSONAL TAXES 
 
 The typical structure of a multinational company with world-wide activities is 
composed by a parent or head company located in one country and subsidiaries 
in many different locations. The shareholders of the parent company are spread 
all over the world. From the perspective of a multinational investor profits 
which result from cross-border investment therefore might be taxed at three 
different levels.  
 
First, taxation takes place at the level of the subsidiary which carries out the 
investment. Second, profits may be taxed at the level of the parent when they are 
repatriated from the subsidiary to the parent company. In general, a tax treaty 
between the host country of the subsidiary and the home country of the parent 
company includes provisions relating to the elimination or mitigation of 
international double taxation on repatriated profits. Thirdly, personal taxes of 
the shareholders are levied in the case of profit repatriation from the parent 
company. In addition, the tax burden at each level depends on how the 
investment is financed. If we consider, for example, equity- and debt-financing 
of the subsidiary by the parent company, the taxation of dividends and of 
interest payments at the level of the parent company has to be included in the 
analysis. 
 
 Compared to this complex structure of several independent levels of taxation, 
our study takes a more narrow perspective. We concentrate on the EU Member 
States as host countries of the subsidiaries and calculate the effective tax burden 
on domestic investments which take place in each Member State. The tax 
burdens are calculated for different types of investment of the subsidiary (e.g. 
buildings, intangibles and machinery) and different ways of financing these 
investments by the parent company (e.g. injection of new equity capital or 
granting a loan). Thereby, we restrict our analysis on the taxes borne at the level 
of the subsidiaries. This means we neither include taxes on repatriated profits 
from the subsidiaries which might be levied at the level of the parent company 
nor personal taxes of the shareholders. 
 
 From the perspective of a multinational investor, however, these assumptions 
are justified by the following considerations. First of all, we want to keep our 
analysis still manageable. Since we do not know in which country the parent 
company (i.e. the multinational investor) is located, we ideally would have to 
include at least the most important locations inside and outside the EU. This 
does not seem to be a feasible task. 
 
 Moreover, if we bring in mind that generally accepted provisions for the 
taxation of the cross-border repatriation of profits exist which are embodied in 
the OECD Model Convention, then the tax burdens borne at the level of the 
subsidiaries already include the most relevant information. In the case of equity-
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financing, for example, dividends from the subsidiary can be either exempt at 
the level of the parent company or a credit for the underlying corporation tax is 
granted. If the exemption method is used – and the levy of withholding taxes on 
dividends is neglected – the tax burden borne at the level of the subsidiary does 
not change. In the case a foreign tax credit is granted, the tax burden at the level 
of the parent company is the minimum tax burden that faces the multinational 
investor. If, in this situation, the tax burden of the subsidiary is higher, the taxes 
in excess become in general definitive. However, even lower foreign tax burdens 
are advantageous since they allow to optimise the position of the parent 
company with regard to the foreign tax credit. Therefore, in most cases the tax 
burden at the level of the subsidiary is relevant for the comparative advantage of 
one location over another location.1 The ranking of the foreign locations in the 
case of debt-financing of the subsidiary is even more straightforward. Since 
interest payments from the subsidiary are – as a general rule – deductible from 
the profits of the subsidiary and subject to taxation at the level of the parent 
company, a lower tax burden at the level of the subsidiary in the case of debt-
financing already indicates comparative advantages over another location and 
vice versa. 
 
 Finally, turning to personal taxes of the shareholders there is no clear answer to 
the question whether they should be included in a comparison of effective tax 
burdens of companies or not. The answer depends to a great extent on the size of 
a company.  
 
From the perspective of a multinational investors, personal taxes of the 
shareholders mostly do not matter since these investors act in the main interest 
of the firm and not in the main interest of the shareholder. This is also confirmed 
by the consideration that multinational companies generally have many different 
tax-paying and tax-exempt shareholders which are resident or non-resident 
individuals and separate legal entities respectively. Since it is impossible in 
practise to identify the relevant shareholders and their tax position, it is 
reasonable to conclude that personal taxes do not matter. Therefore personal 
taxes of the shareholders of the parent company are excluded from our 
international comparison of the effective tax burdens of companies. Moreover, if 
the subsidiary is under the exclusive control of the parent company, personal 
taxes in the host country of the subsidiary do not matter because there are no 
other shareholders besides the parent company. Therefore, we do not account for 
personal taxes in the host country of the subsidiary either. 
 
The situation would be different, however, if we considered small and medium-
sized companies (SMEs). Since these companies know the tax status of their 
owners and the most important source of income for the owners is the company, 
                                                     
1 The multinational investor should, however, always take into account individual circumstances 
such as the relevant provisions of tax treaties. 
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a meaningful comparison of the effective tax burden of SMEs would have to 
include personal taxes. 
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III. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
The comparison of the effective levels of company taxation is made in two 
stages. Chapter B describes the basic elements of the company tax regimes of 
the EU Member States to the extent that they are relevant for this study. We 
concentrate on corporations as the relevant legal form of a company. The 
qualitative analysis of the tax regimes focuses on the corporation tax and on the 
additional profit taxes and non-profit taxes levied from the corporation, both at 
state level and municipal level. With respect to the corporation tax attention is 
given to the composition of the tax base, the tax rates and the corporation tax 
systems. Since we only consider taxes borne at the corporation level, the 
personal income tax regimes are not included in this study, nor are wage taxes, 
social insurance contributions, pension payments, etc. Capital duty is also not 
included, as this is a one-time levy only, which does not fit in the model we have 
used for the calculations and which focuses on taxes that are levied on a 
periodical basis. Moreover, we explicitly exclude special investment incentives. 
For detailed information with respect to the tax parameters used in this study for 
our calculations, we refer to Appendix A. 
 
Chapter C calculates the effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) on domestic 
investment in the 15 EU Member States. For the calculations we use the model 
of King and Fullerton (1984). In a first step, we briefly introduce the 
methodological concept and the most important assumptions of the model. These 
assumptions are also summarised in Appendix B. Section II determines and 
compares the EMTR in the Member States taking as a base case data which is 
typical for the manufacturing sector. Section III examines how the results will be 
affected by alternative assumptions on the economic data of the company. 
Section IV then recalculates the effective tax burdens using data for 12 other 
industries. In 1999, Baker & McKenzie prepared a comprehensive report which 
included the same countries and applied the same methodology as in this study. 
The report from 1999 used information about the tax regimes which were in 
force in 1998. Based on this information, Section V recalculates the effective tax 
burdens on companies beginning with the fiscal year 1998 up to the year 2001. 
This summarises the consequences of the main tax reforms during this period. 
Detailed country results are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Chapter D includes a brief summary of the main conclusions. 
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CHAPTER B 
 
REGIMES OF COMPANY TAXATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EU 
 
 
I. CORPORATION TAX 
 
1. Overview 
 
A corporation can either be a public limited company (plc.) or a limited company 
(ltd.). Anyway, corporations are separate legal entities and subject to corporate 
income tax independently from the taxation of their shareholders. This is true 
irrespective whether the shareholder is a natural person or another corporation and 
whether he is located domestically or abroad. In general, corporation income tax is 
levied on the world-wide income of a resident corporation.2 A corporation is 
resident in that country where it has its domicile or its place of management. These 
criteria are usually quite similar between the EU Member States. 
 
The computation of the tax base for corporation income tax purposes is in principle 
based on the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) which are 
relevant for financial accounting. However, the GAAPs are adjusted and modified 
according to the provisions of the national tax codes. Since neither theses 
adjustments nor the national GAAPs exactly correspond to each other, taxable 
income will differ across Member States. 
 
The corporation tax rates including surcharges (as from January 1, 2001) vary 
between 12.5% in Ireland3 and 40.17% in Belgium. The average tax rate within the 
EU Member States currently amounts to 31.83%. However, some countries levy 
special tax rates on certain categories of income from a corporation. 
 
There exist various types of corporation tax systems. If the systems are classified to 
the extent of the integration of the corporation income tax into the corporate or 
personal income tax of the shareholder, three different categories can be 
distinguished: classical system, double taxation reducing and double taxation 
avoiding systems. Currently, corporation tax systems belonging to all of these 
categories exist within the EU. Since relief for corporation tax is in general only 
granted to domestic shareholders – and if the levy of withholding taxes on 
dividends is neglected – the tax burden borne at the level of a (EU-based) 
subsidiary is in general the minimum tax burden that faces a multinational investor. 
 
                                                     
2 Within the EU, the only exception is France where the territorial principle applies. 
3 The 12.5% tax rate in Ireland will become effective not before 2003. However, we already have 
considered this rate in our report. The actual rate of the year 2001 is 20%. 
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 However, the tax burden borne at the level of a subsidiary is only relevant in the 
case that investments of the subsidiary are financed by the parent company with 
equity capital. Another possibility of financing the subsidiary would be a loan by 
the foreign parent company. Since the corporation (i.e. the EU subsidiary) and its 
shareholders (i.e. the foreign parent company) are separate legal entities, interest 
expenses derived from financial arrangements between the parent and the 
subsidiary are deductible from the profits of the subsidiary. Since the interest 
payments are taxable at the parent's level, it is not the tax burden borne at the level 
of the subsidiary but rather the tax burden at the level of the parent that faces the 
multinational investor. Although, interest deduction on inter-company loans at 
arm's length standards is, in general, available in all EU Member States, certain 
countries limit the deductibility by applying so-called thin capitalisation rules. 
 
 
2. Tax Bases 
 
The basis for the computation of taxable income (i.e. the corporation tax base) is 
formed by the national Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
which are relevant for financial accounting. In all EU Member States, the 
provisions for financial and tax accounting are linked to some extent. Moreover, 
within the EU, the national GAAPs are harmonised to a great extent by the 4th 
EC Directive from 1978. Therefore, if the national GAAPs were equal and were 
relevant for the computation of taxable income in each Member State without 
exception, then there would exist in principle an uniform tax base within the EU. 
 
But this is not true for many reasons. Although a dependence between financial 
and tax accounting prevails in most Member States, this linkage does not exist 
all over the EU. By contrast, in the Anglo-Dutch countries, independence 
between financial and tax accounting is the prevalent concept. Moreover, even if 
there is a linkage between financial and tax accounting, the national GAAPs are 
adjusted and modified to different extents for certain binding tax provisions. 
Finally, since the 4th EC Directive includes a lot of accounting options and 
choices, the national GAAPs in the Member States are not totally harmonised. 
Therefore, as a general rule, only the framework for the determination of taxable 
income is harmonised to a certain extent. For example, acquisition costs are the 
key norm for the valuation of assets and the realisation principle is recognised as 
a point of time when profits and losses enter the accounts. 
 
 By contrast, various differences with regard to particular elements of the tax bases 
exist. The most important rules are presented in Table B.1 and explained in more 
detail in the following. The provisions for the computation of taxable income which 
are incorporated in our model are presented in Tables A.A.5 – A.A.8 of Appendix 
A. 
 
 
 
Table B.1: Most important rules for the computation of taxable income in the EU Member States 
 
 
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom 
Relationship between financial and  
tax accounting 
yes Yes no yes yes yes yes no yes yes no yes yes yes no 
Depreciation                
Goodwill                
Depreciation method straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line not 
depreciable 
straight-line straight-line not 
depreciable 
straight-line straight-line straight-line not 
depreciable 
straight-line straight-line / 
declining-
balance 
not 
depreciable 
Depreciation period  15 years 5 years 7 years 10 years - 15 years 5 years - 10 years 10 years 5 years - 10 years 5 years - 
Depreciation rate, if declining-balance meth              max. 30%  
Other intangible assets                
Depreciation method straight-line straight-line 100% first year 
allowance on 
option 
straight-line straight-line  straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line usually 
straight-line 
straight-line straight-line straight-line / 
declining-
balance 
declining-
balance  
(pooled basis) 
Depreciation rate, if declining-balance meth - - - - - - - - - - - - - max. 30% 25% 
Office buildings                
Depreciation method straight-line straight-line / 
declining-
balance  
not 
depreciable 
declining-
balance 
straight-line straight-line straight-line not 
depreciable 
straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line not 
depreciable 
Depreciation period 50 years 33.3 years - - 25 years 33.3 years 8.3-20 years - 25 years 33.3-50 years normally  
40 years 
50 years 50 years  50 years - 
Depreciation rate, if declining-balance meth - 6% - 4% - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other industrial buildings                
Depreciation method straight-line straight-line / 
declining-
balance 
straight-line declining-
balance 
straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line straight-line  straight-line 
Depreciation period 25 years 20 years 20 years - 20-50 years 33.3 years 8.3-20 years 25 years 25 years 20-25 years 40 years 20 years 33.3 years 25 years 25 years 
Depreciation rate, if declining-balance meth - 10% - 7% - - - - - - - - - - - 
Plants, machinery, office equipment                
Depreciation method straight-line straight-line / 
declining-
balance 
declining-
balance  
(pooled basis)
declining-
balance  
(pooled basis)
straight-line / 
declining-
balance 
straight-line / 
declining-
balance 
straight-line / 
declining 
balance 
straight-line straight-line declining-
balance / 
straight-line 
usually 
straight-line 
straight-line / 
declining-
balance  
straight-line / 
declining-
balance 
straight-line / 
declining-
balance 
declining-
balance 
(pooled basis) 
Depreciation rate, if declining-balance meth - max. 40% max. 25% max. 25% 1,25 - 2,25 x 
the straight-
line rate 
max. 20% 3 x the 
straight-line 
rate 
- - max. 30% - 1,5 - 2,5 x the 
straight-line 
rate 
1,5 - 2,5 x the 
straight-line 
rate 
max. 30% 25% 
If declining-balance method, shift to 
straight-line method possible 
- Yes no no yes yes - - - yes - yes yes yes no 
Max. cost of assets fully written of  
in year of acquisition 
ATS 5.000 arrangement DKK 9.500 FIM 5.000 
 
FRF 2.500 DEM 800 GRD 200.000 - ITL 1 Mio LUF 35.000 NLG 1.000 PTE 40.000 - SEK 2.000 – 
10.000 
- 
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 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom 
Inventories 
 
 
 
FIFO / LIFO / 
weighted 
average 
FIFO / LIFO / 
weighted 
average 
FIFO /  
weighted 
average 
FIFO FIFO /  
weighted 
average 
LIFO /  
weighted 
average 
FIFO / 
weighted 
average 
FIFO / 
weighted 
average 
FIFO / LIFO / 
weighted 
average 
FIFO / HIFO / 
LIFO /  
weighted 
average 
FIFO / base-
stock-system / 
weighted 
average 
FIFO / LIFO / 
weighted 
average 
FIFO / LIFO / 
weighted 
average 
97% FIFO FIFO /  
weighted 
average 
Reserves for bad debts / 
contingent liabilities 
specification specification no no specification specification restriction specification restriction specification specification restriction specification specification specification 
Pension costs pension 
reserve, 
pension funds 
pension funds pension funds pension funds pension funds pension 
reserve, 
pension funds
pension funds pension funds pension funds pension 
reserve, 
pension funds
pension 
reserve, 
pension funds
pension funds pension funds pension 
reserve, 
pension funds 
pension funds 
Losses                
carry-forward unlimited unlimited 5 years 10 years 5 years unlimited 5 years unlimited 5 years unlimited unlimited 6 years 10 years unlimited unlimited 
carry–back - - - - 3 years 1 year - 3 years - - 3 years - - - 1 year 
Capital gains roll-over relief roll-over relief 
exemption 
roll-over relief
exemption 
indexation 
roll-over relief reduced rates 
in special 
cases 
roll-over relief
exemption 
roll-over relief 
reduced rates 
in special 
cases 
roll-over relief 
reduced rate 
indexation 
suspension of 
taxation 
possible 
roll-over relief roll-over relief 
exemptions 
roll-over relief 
indexation 
roll-over relief 
indexation 
- roll-over relief 
indexation 
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- Goodwill:  
 
 Goodwill is depreciable for tax purposes in all Member States except France, 
Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In general, the straight-line 
depreciation method is used over periods varying between 5 and 15 years. Since 
the depreciation of goodwill is of highest relevance on the occasion of an 
acquisition of a company, the depreciation rules are less important for the 
periodical taxation and in case of creation of a company. 
 
- Intangibles:  
 
Intangibles acquired from third parties4 (e.g. patents) are depreciable in all 
Member States. The straight-line depreciation method over the expected period 
of use prevails with exceptions for Sweden and the United Kingdom. Both 
countries apply the declining-balance method. 
 
- Buildings:  
 
With respect to buildings one should distinguish between office buildings and 
industrial buildings. Certain Member States – Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom – do not allow depreciation on office buildings (or non-industrial 
commercial buildings). By contrast, industrial buildings may be depreciated in 
all Member States. The straight-line depreciation method is generally allowed, 
in two countries the declining-balance method is optional (Belgium) or 
compulsory (Finland). The depreciation periods vary between 20 and 50 years 
and are in general longer for office buildings. 
 
- Tangible fixes assets:  
 
Tangible fixed assets such as plant and machinery and office equipment are 
depreciated in all Member States. Most countries allow on option the straight-
line method or the declining-balance method. Only Austria, Ireland and Italy 
restrict depreciation to the straight-line method. If the declining-balance method 
is applied, the depreciation rates can amount up to 50% for assets with an useful 
life of three years.5  
 
- Inventories:  
 
Inventories are valued at production costs. These may differ in particular with 
respect to the incorporation of production overheads. Changes in stock of 
finished goods and work in progress are in general valued at the weighted 
                                                     
4 The costs for self created intangibles (e.g. research & development) can be deducted 
immediately from the tax base. 
5 For example, in Spain the annual straigth-line depreciation rate is increased by 50% if the useful 
life of an asset is less than 5 years. Thus, if the useful life is 3 years, the depreciation rate is 50% 
(= 33.33% * 1.5). 
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average cost method. Optionally, most Member States allow other allocation 
methods such as FIFO. By contrast, LIFO cannot be universally applied in 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. In times of inflation, LIFO is advantageous since it avoids the 
taxation of inflationary gains. 
 
- Provisions:  
 
Within the scope of this study it is not possible to develop a comprehensive 
overview or even a ranking on the tax treatment of provisions. Instead, in order 
to best highlight the principle legal framework of the Member States, we have 
concentrated on provisions for bad debts or uncertain (contingent) liabilities. 
Although all Member States except Denmark and Finland generally allow to 
deduct contributions to provisions for bad debt from taxable income, deduction 
is in most countries only allowed upon specification. The necessary proofs are 
likely to differ across countries. Three countries – Greece, Italy and Portugal – 
even restrict the deductible amounts to a narrow quantitative limitation. A 
general deduction without specification is not allowed in any of the Member 
States. 
 
- Pension costs:  
 
The provisions of the national tax codes for the deductibility of pension costs 
are rather complex. In principle, the deductibility depends on the manner in 
which the occupational pension scheme is financed. With respect to the 
financing, we can distinguish between funded and unfunded schemes. 
Funded schemes prevail in the Anglo-Dutch countries as well as in most 
other EU Member States. In these countries companies make regular cash 
contributions to a pension fund (or an insurance company) which collects the 
money and is responsible for the future pension payments to the employees. 
By contrast, the predominant system in Germany, Austria and Luxembourg 
still is an unfunded scheme. This differs from a funded scheme with respect 
to the person legally responsible for the future pension payments. In an 
unfunded scheme the company (employer) is responsible, whereas in the 
case of a funded scheme the pension fund (or the insurance company) is 
responsible. In both cases, however, the costs for the future pension 
payments are deductible from the tax base of the company (employer) upon 
realisation: in the case of a funded scheme the premiums paid to the pension 
fund are deductible and in the case of an unfunded scheme the company 
accounts for a pension reserve in the balance sheet and deducts annual 
contributions to this book reserve from the tax base. 
 
Although all Member States allow to deduct costs for future pension payments 
from the tax base either as contributions to pension reserves or as payments to 
external funds and similar (insurance) institutions, it is very difficult to compare 
the deductible amounts. They depend on the individual pension plan (e.g. 
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whether it is a defined benefit or a defined contribution plan) as well as on the 
actuarial assumptions, the national accounting standards and special provisions 
of the national tax codes. However, as a general rule, in contrast to many other 
statements it is not true that the deduction of contributions to provisions for 
pension reserves is more tax beneficial than the deduction of premiums paid to 
pension funds. Many individual examples as well as empirical evidence proof 
the opposite. 
 
- Losses:  
 
Losses occurred in the usual business may be carried forward and deducted 
from future taxable income in all Member States. However, limitations in time 
are very common. Only eight Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) grant 
an unlimited loss carry-forward. By contrast, two thirds of the Member States 
have no loss carry-back. From the remaining five countries that allow a loss 
carry-back, two countries limit the period to one year (Germany and the United 
Kingdom) and three countries have limitations to the previous three years 
(France, Ireland and the Netherlands). As a consequence of these various 
restrictions, the country ranking of the effective tax burdens of companies in a 
loss situation can be completely different from the ranking of companies which 
always pay taxes. 
 
- Capital gains:  
 
With respect to the taxation of capital gains considerable differences between 
the national tax provisions exist. From the Member States, only Sweden 
generally includes capital gains in the ordinary business income where they are 
taxed accordingly. In the other countries, relief is available under various 
provisions. 
 
Roll-over relief is granted in all of those countries with the exception of France 
and Italy. Since the roll-over relief is not granted to same types of assets in all 
countries – short-life assets, for example, are excluded in many countries – 
there is, however, no uniform tax treatment in this respect. Indexation of 
acquisition costs in order to account for inflation and reduce taxable capital 
gains due to price increases is available in Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
and the United Kingdom. A general reduced tax rate on capital gains is applied 
in Ireland and – limited to specified assets, however, - in France and Greece. 
Finally, some capital gains, in particular gains upon the disposal of shares in 
other corporations, are exempt from taxation in Belgium, Denmark, Germany 
and the Netherlands. 
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 Table B.2: Thin capitalisation rules in the EU Member States 
Country Debt-to-equity ratio 
Austria No specific rules 
Belgium 7:1 if paid into countries with low tax rates 
Denmark 4:1 
Finland No specific rules 
France 1.5:1 
Germany 1.5:1 
Greece No specific rules 
Ireland No specific rules 
Italy No specific rules 
Luxembourg No specific rules 
Netherlands No specific rules (85:15 rulings) 
Portugal 2:1 
Spain 3:1 
Sweden No specific rules 
United Kingdom 1:1 
 
 It has already been emphasised that, from the perspective of a foreign based 
multinational investor, a subsidiary can be financed inter alia either by the injection 
of new equity capital or by granting a loan. In the case of debt-financing, interest 
payments are generally deductible from the corporation tax base of the subsidiary if 
they are in accordance with the arm's length standards. However, eight out of the 15 
Member States explicitly apply so-called thin capitalisation rules. This means that 
particular debt-to-equity ratios are defined which are presented in Table B.2. In the 
event that a loan granted by the parent company exceeds such a debt-to-equity 
ratio, the related interest payment is deemed a hidden profit distribution and, hence, 
disallowed as a deductible expense. Since these ratios are in general quite generous, 
no real constraints for the debt-financing of a subsidiary by its parent company 
exist. In addition, many countries increase these ratios if the loan is granted to a 
holding company. 
 
 
3. Tax Rates 
 
The corporate income tax rates in the EU Member States are usually linear. 
Occasionally, different rates are used in one country depending on the size of a 
corporation (small, medium or large) and its profits respectively. Such reduced tax 
rates for smaller companies or in the event of relatively low profits are used in 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
Two Member States – Austria and France – also impose a minimum tax which is 
creditable against the corporation tax due. Therefore, an extra tax burden only 
exists in loss situations. In five Member States – Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and Portugal – the standard tax rate is increased by temporary 
surcharges. 
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 Table B.3: Corporation tax rates in the EU Member States (%) 
Country Corporation 
tax rate for 
small com-
panies 
Standard 
corporation 
tax rate 
Surcharge on 
corporation 
tax rate 
Effective 
standard 
corporation 
tax rate 
Special 
corporation 
tax rate 
Austria – 34.00 – 34.00 25.00 
Belgium 28.00 39.00 3.00 40.17 – 
Denmark – 30.00 – 30.00 – 
Finland – 29.00 – 29.00 – 
France 25.00 33.33 9.30 36.43 – 
Germany – 25.00 5.50 26.38 – 
Greece – 37.50 – 37.50 15.00 
Irelanda) – 12.50 – 12.50 - 
Italy – 37.00 – 37.00 19.00/27.00 
Luxembourg 20.00 30.00 4.00 31.20 – 
Netherlands 30.00 35.00 – 35.00 – 
Portugal – 32.00 10.00 35.20 – 
Spain 30.00 35.00 – 35.00 – 
Sweden – 28.00 – 28.00 – 
United Kingdom 10.00 30.00 – 30.00 – 
EU-Average – 31.15 – 31.83 – 
a) As from 2003 
 
 From the country data presented in Table B.3 we can see that the effective standard 
corporation tax rates including surcharges vary between 12.5% in Ireland and 
40.17% in Belgium. Hence, the spread between the highest and the lowest tax rate 
amounts to 27.67 percentage points. The average tax rate within the EU Member 
States currently amounts to 31.83%. There are, however, only four countries – 
Finland, Germany, Ireland and Sweden – with a statutory corporation tax rate 
below 30%. Therefore, the relatively low average tax rate can be mainly attributed 
to 12.5% rate of Ireland which will become effective not before 2003 but which is 
already considered in our report.6 Since, in reality, the level of the statutory tax rate 
has a considerable impact on location decisions of multinational investors,7 the high 
spread between the corporation tax rates can distort location decisions within the 
EU to a great extent. However, a comparison of the corporation tax rates is 
incomplete since local profit taxes – in case they are levied – have to be added in 
order to arrive at the effective statutory tax rate on profits. Germany, for example, 
levies a local trade tax on income at an average rate of currently 17.63%. This 
results in an effective statutory tax rate on profits of 39.35% respect given to the 
deductibility of the trade tax from the base of the corporation tax. Consequently, 
Germany falls back in the country ranking from the lowest to the highest tax rate 
                                                     
6 The Irish corporation tax rate is 20% for 2001 and 16% for 2002. 
7 For empirical evidence see Devereux (1992). 
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from second to thirteenth place, if we consider local taxes on profits besides 
corporation tax.8 
 
 Three Member States also levy lower tax rates on certain categories of income of a 
corporation. Interest income of a Greek corporation is currently taxed at a final rate 
of 15%. This clearly favours investments in financial assets over other assets. In 
Austria and Italy, profits which can be attributed to the increase in the equity capital 
of a company are taxed at lower rates compared to the rest of the profits. These so-
called dual income tax concepts, however, reach far beyond a simple reduction of 
the tax rate. The principle aim of the dual income tax is to achieve more neutrality 
with respect to the financing of a company. Since debt-financing is favoured over 
against equity-financing due to the deductibility of interest payments from the 
corporation tax base, more neutrality can be achieved by favouring self-financing 
from retained earnings and equity capital contributions from the shareholders 
leaving other things equal. Therefore, under the dual income tax in both countries, a 
portion of income that is deemed to be derived from the increase in the equity 
capital is deducted from the ordinary taxable income and taxed at reduced rates. In 
both countries, the deemed income is derived at by applying a standardised return 
to the increases of the equity capital. The standardised return is derived from the 
yield of state and private bonds. Since this return is fixed to a "normal" rate this 
also means that the benefits from dual income taxation will decrease the higher the 
profitability (or the return on equity) of a company is. The reduced tax rates amount 
to 25% in Austria (instead of 34%) and to 19% in Italy (instead of 37%). In Italy, 
however, the aggregate corporation tax rate resulting from the application of the 
ordinary and the reduced tax rate cannot be lower than a minimum of 27%.9 
 
 The Austrian and Italian concept of dual income tax stands for a division of the 
taxable income of a company into income attributed to equity-financing and to 
other income.10 This concept cannot be compared with the dual income tax 
prevailing in Finland and Sweden (and Norway) which is also known as the Nordic 
Model.11 In both countries, all sources of capital income are taxed at the same flat 
rate which is significantly lower than the tax rate on earned income. Earned income 
is more or less income derived from labour and taxed at progressive rates 
amounting to approximately 60%, compared to tax rates below 30% on capital 
income (see Table B.4). Capital income is defined very broadly and covers income 
                                                     
8 See Table A.A.1 of Appendix A. 
9 We use the 27% tax rate in our calculations. 
10 The technical procedure of deducting a fictitious return on equity capital contains elements of 
the so-called "Allowance for Corporate Equity" (ACE), which is a variant of a cash flow tax 
and, hence, of a broader concept of consumption tax. See Gammie (1991); Jacobs and Schmidt 
(1997). However, under ACE, the tax rate on the fictitious return on equity capital as well as on 
interest is zero (i.e. the returns and interest payments are tax exempt). Since interest payments 
are still taxable as are profits of a corporation upon distribution there is still a tax burden on 
these sources of income. Therefore, it is not clear to decide whether dual income tax is in line 
with ACE (and, hence, with a consumption tax) or still in line with income taxation. We think 
the latter is true, since the income is still taxed. 
11 See Cnossen (2000); Viherkenttä (1993). 
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from businesses, rental and royalty income, interest income, dividends and capital 
gains. Therefore, the Nordic type of dual income tax stands for the division of total 
income into capital income and earned income. Since the same flat tax rate applies 
on all categories of capital income, there is no preferential treatment of equity 
financing. 
 
 
4. Tax Systems 
 
Corporation tax systems can be catalogued according to various criteria. If the 
systems are classified to the extent of the integration of the corporation income 
tax into the personal income tax of the shareholder, three different categories 
can be distinguished: classical system, double taxation reducing and double 
taxation avoiding systems. In the classical system, dividends are neither exempt 
by the company nor is the shareholder entitled to a tax credit or some other relief 
for corporation tax. Measures for reduction or avoidance of double taxation can 
be achieved either through the company or the shareholder. With regard to 
companies, a deduction of dividends as business expenses or a split corporation 
tax rate which favours a distribution of profits against retention12 can be 
considered. With regard to shareholders, the relief alternatives exist in the 
granting of a tax credit and in the preferential treatment of divided income 
compared to other income. From the nine possible alternatives there are 
presently five that are used within the EU. The possibilities and the countries are 
listed in Figure B.1. 
 
The classical system still only exists in Ireland. Under this system, dividends 
without regard of the corporate income tax payment are subject to the ordinary – 
in general progressive – individual income tax rate. This results in a double 
taxation of dividend income with corporation tax and personal income tax. 
 
Contrary to this is the full imputation system that results generally in an 
avoidance of double taxation by crediting the paid corporate income tax on the 
income tax of the shareholder who is entitled to imputation credit. This system 
operates in Finland, France13 and Italy14. In these countries, dividends are 
incorporated together with a tax credit (grossed-up basis) that corresponds to the 
corporation tax underlying the dividends in the individual income tax base. The 
grossed-up amount is generally taxed progressively. As a result, distributed 
profits are subject only to the personal income tax of the shareholder. If the 
individual income tax on the grossed-up basis exceeds the corporation tax credit, 
the difference has to be paid by the shareholder. If, on the other hand, the 
                                                     
12 I.e. a split-rate system which was in force in Germany until 2000 and taxed distributed profits 
(30%) at a lower rate than retained earnings (40%). 
13 Since France levies temporary surcharges on the corporation tax which are not creditable against 
personal income tax (see Table B.2), there is currently in fact no full imputation. 
14 Since portfolio shareholders may opt for a taxation of dividends with a final withholding tax (at 
a rate of currently 12.5%), the Italian system has also elements of a shareholder relief system. 
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corporation tax credit exceeds the personal income tax, the excess corporation 
tax credit is refunded to the shareholder. 
 
An avoidance of double taxation can also be achieved through a system of 
exemption of dividends from personal income tax, as it is applied in Greece. The 
outcome of this is that dividends are only taxed once as they are through a full 
imputation system. However, in the dividend exemption system, the corporation 
tax rate and not the personal income tax rate is decisive for the tax burden. 
 
 Figure B.1: Systems of Corporate Income Taxation  
in the Member States of the EU 
 
 
Between the classical system and double taxation avoiding systems are the 
double taxation reducing systems. These systems only partially abolish the 
double taxation of dividends. In the EU, double taxation reducing system are 
present in two forms: one in the form of a partial imputation system and the 
other in the form of a so-called shareholder relief package. Both systems work to 
reduce the effects of double taxation at the shareholder level. 
 
Partial imputation systems exist in Spain and Portugal. In these countries, like in 
the full imputation system, dividends are incorporated together with a tax credit 
in the individual income tax base and then are progressively taxed together with 
the other sources of income. However, since the tax credit is generally smaller 
than the underlying corporate tax, the double taxation on dividends is, of course, 
reduced but not completely avoided. 
 
 
Systems of Corporate Taxation 
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System
Double Taxation 
Reducing Systems
Double Taxation  
Avoiding Systems 
Shareholder 
Level Corporate Level 
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Exemption
Full Tax 
Imputation 
System 
Split  
Corporate  
Tax Rate 
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Deduction
100 %
Shareholder Relief Split Rate  
System 
Dividend 
Deduction 
< 100 % 
Shareholder 
LevelCorporate Level 
Ireland Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden, 
United Kingdom
Spain
Portugal
Finland 
France 
Italy 
Greece
Partial
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 The same can be said for the shareholder relief systems existing in the majority 
of the EU Member States. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom all use shareholder 
relief systems. In these eight countries there is a mitigation of the double 
taxation on dividends through a more or less rough reduction of personal income 
tax on dividend income. The reduction of personal income tax on dividends can 
take different forms. 
 
 In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom15 dividends are not included in the global personal income tax base but 
instead are taxed at reduced tax rates compared to the ordinary income tax rates. 
In most cases these reduced tax rates are final. Although there is a double 
taxation on dividends with corporation tax and personal income tax, it is not a 
“classical” double taxation, since a reduced income tax rate applies.  
 
 In the Netherlands, however, the shareholder relief system applies only to 
shareholders who have a substantial interest in a company. An interest of at least 
5% in the issued share capital of a company is characterised as a substantial 
business interest. By contrast, shareholders without a substantial business 
interest are not taxed with their dividend income actually received. Instead, a 
fixed assumed return of 4% on the actual value of the shares is calculated each 
year (investment yield tax16). This assumed return is taxed at a flat rate of 30%. 
This means that the tax due is effectively 1.2% on the value of the shares (30% 
of 4%). Since the tax is not levied on the dividend income actually received, in 
fact, the yield tax is rather a net wealth tax than an income tax. 
 
 Compared to the application of a reduced and final tax rate, the ”Half Rate 
Procedure” that exists in Austria produces somewhat different results. Here 
dividends are subject to a final withholding tax of 25% unless a tax assessment 
at half of the average income tax rate does not arrive at a lower tax burden. This 
means, that compared with the application of the final tax rate double taxation 
on dividends is further reduced if the average income tax rate is less than 50%. 
 
 Another variant of the shareholder relief is used in Germany and Luxembourg. 
In both countries, 50% of the dividends can be deducted from the personal 
income tax base. This so-called “Half Income Procedure” produces almost the 
same outcome as the application of half of the average income tax rate which is 
applicable in Austria. This can result solely in a different rate of progression so 
that dividends are included at different volumes in the tax base. However, under 
the “Half Income Procedure”, expenses which are related to the dividend income 
                                                     
15 In the United Kingdom, dividends still are grossed-up by one ninth of their amount. However, 
this gross-up cannot be qualified as a tax credit anymore since there is no refund. Moreover, the 
higher tax rate on dividend income (32.5%) is explicitly lower than the higher tax rate on 
ordinary income (40%). 
16 See Meussen (2000). 
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can, as a consequence of the 50% exemption of the income, only be deducted by 
one half of their amount from the income tax base. 
 
 The dominance of the shareholder relief systems within the EU is the result of a 
longer trend in the last decade. Germany abolished its full imputation system 
(2001). Belgium (1992), Denmark (1991) and the United Kingdom (1999) 
changed from their partial imputation systems and Sweden17 (1995) from a 
dividend exemption scheme to a shareholder relief system. Finally, Luxembourg 
(1994) and the Netherlands (1997) – as far as shareholders with a substantial 
interest in a company are concerned – gave up the classical system in favour of a 
reduced taxation of dividends at the shareholder level. 
 
 The recent examples of Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom 
as well as Ireland, which abolished its partial imputation system in 1999 and 
introduced a classical system, illustrate that currently there is a turning away 
from the imputation systems within the EU. This development can be best 
explained by the requirements of the EC Law and the complexity of imputation 
systems in comparison with the classical system and shareholder relief systems. 
 
 Table B.4 lists the standard corporation tax rates which are shown in the third 
column of Table B.3, the amounts of the corporation tax credit and – in case of a 
shareholder relief system – the reduced personal income tax rates. Moreover, in 
order to illustrate the effects of the different systems, the overall tax burden of 
dividends with corporation and personal income tax is calculated under 
simplifying assumptions. 
 
 Under a strict national view, the full imputation system has evident advantages, 
since distributed profits of a corporation are subject only to the personal income 
tax of the shareholder (see final columns of Table B.4). Consequently, decisions 
as to the legal form of a company (e.g. partnership or corporation) and the 
financing of a corporation (e.g. debt- or equity-financing) are generally not 
affected by tax considerations. Moreover, when the corporation tax rate and the 
personal income tax rate (on capital income) correspond, as they do, for 
example, in Finland, then the distribution of profits results in no other total tax 
burden than the retention of earnings. In such a situation, the decision about the 
distribution of corporate profits can be made independently from taxation. In all 
other corporation tax systems except for the dividend exemption system, the 
income tax borne at the corporation level is either partially (e.g. partial 
imputation system or shareholder relief system) or completely definitive 
(classical system), so that there is ex definitione no tax neutrality. 
 
 However, (full and partial) imputation systems operate completely different in the 
case of cross-border investment. In contrast to domestic dividends, in general no 
                                                     
17 Sweden exempts a certain amount of dividends paid from small and mediums sized corporations 
to domestic shareholders. 
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corporation tax credit is granted for foreign source dividends. The denial of a tax 
credit in this situation results in a double taxation of foreign source dividends with 
foreign corporation tax and domestic personal income tax. Therefore, with respect 
to outbound investment, imputation systems isolate markets and operate as the 
classical system. Since domestic dividends are taxed only once with personal 
income tax, the double taxation of foreign source dividends evidently hampers 
cross-border activities. Furthermore, as far as outbound investments in other EU 
Member States are concerned – there is presumably a conflict with fundamental 
freedoms embodied in the EC Treaty, particularly with the freedom of 
establishment (Art. 43-48 EC Treaty) and the free movement of capital (Art. 56-60 
EC Treaty).18 
 
Table B.4: Corporation tax systems, corporation tax credits and 
corporation and personal income tax rates in the Member States of the EU 
Corporation Tax System Corporation 
tax rate in 
%a) 
Tax credit in % of Top marginal personal 
income tax rate in % 
Tax burden of distri-
buted dividends with 
corporation and per-
sonal income tax in % 
 
 Dividends 
Corporation 
tax 
General Dividends Maximum 
Income 
tax rate 
40% 
Classical System: 
- Ireland 12.50 0.00 0.00 44.00
 
44.00 
 
51.00 47.50
Reduction of double taxation: 
A: Partial Imputation System: 
- Portugal 
- Spain 
B: Shareholder Relief: 
- Austria 
- Belgium 
- Denmark 
- Germanyb) 
- Luxembourgb) 
- Netherlandsc) 
- Sweden 
- United Kingdom 
32.00
35.00
34.00
39.00
30.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
28.00
30.00
23.24
40.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
11.11
60.00
74.29
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
25.93
40.00
48.00
50.00
55.00
59.00
48.50
42.00
52.00
61.00
40.00
 
 
40.00 
48.00 
 
25.00 
15.00 
40.00 
24.25 
21.00 
25.00 
30.00 
32.50 
 
 
47.68 
52.68 
 
50.50 
48.15 
58.00 
43.19 
44.70 
51.25 
49.60 
47.50 
47.68
45.40
60.40
63.40
58.00
40.00
44.00
61.00
56.80
53.33
Avoidance of double taxation: 
A: Full Imputation System: 
- Finland 
- France 
- Italy 
B: Dividend Exemption: 
- Greece 
29.00
33.33
37.00
37.50
40.85
50.00
58.73
0.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
0.00
67.50
53.25
45.50
45.00
 
 
29.00 
53.25 
45.50 
 
0.00 
 
 
29.00 
53.25 
45.50 
 
37.50 
40.00
40.00
40.00
37.50
a) See third column of Table B.3 
b) 50% of dividend income is exempt from personal income tax. Therefore, the income tax rate is reduced accordingly 
c) Only for shareholders with a substantial interest in a corporation. Otherwise, the investment yield tax is levied 
 
                                                     
18 See also Jacobs (1999). 
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 Under an imputation system, the conflict with EC Law could be solved by 
extending the corporation tax credit to foreign source dividends. However, 
crediting foreign corporation taxes on an unilateral basis without mutual or bilateral 
compensation for revenue losses, is very costly for a country. Moreover, with 
reference to the Foreign Income Dividend (FID) scheme in the United Kingdom, 
which was abolished only a few years after its introduction in 1994, it is very 
complicated and complex to implement cross-border foreign corporation tax credits 
into domestic imputation systems.19 
 
 As a result of the increasing pressure from EC Law and the high complexity of the 
imputation system, both Germany20 and the United Kingdom21 have abolished their 
imputation systems and introduced shareholder relief systems. Obviously, the 
classical system and the shareholder relief systems do not come into conflict with 
the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty, since – from the perspective of a 
domestic investor – domestic and foreign source dividends are treated in exactly the 
same way: dividends are subject to taxation as well at the (domestic or foreign) 
corporation level as at the (domestic) shareholder level.22 Although the classical 
system and shareholder relief systems do not discriminate cross-border activities 
against domestic investment, they are not neutral towards economic decisions of 
investors. For example, equity-financing of outbound investments is generally 
discriminated against debt-financing, since dividend income is taxed twice and 
interest income only once.23 
 
 From the perspective of a multinational investor, the most tax efficient place of 
location for a subsidiary in one of the EU Member States is generally not affected 
by the type of the corporation tax system in the different countries. Since relief for 
corporation tax under every system – irrespective whether inside or outside the EU 
– is generally only granted to domestic shareholders, and double taxation of 
dividends received from a (EU-based) subsidiary is mitigated according to the 
provisions in the home country of the parent company, the type of corporation tax 
system in the host country of the subsidiary is not of high interest for a foreign 
based multinational investor. 
 
 An exception from this admittedly general conclusion has to be made for countries 
which explicitly extent their corporation tax credits to foreign investors. For 
example, certain shareholders of British corporations are entitled to a refund of a 
                                                     
19 For details of the FID scheme see Gammie (1994). 
20 See Jacobs and Spengel (2000). 
21 See Gammie (1997). 
22 Under a shareholder relief system, this non-discrimination requires, that relief is also granted to 
foreign source dividends. This is true for the new German tax system (see Endres and 
Oestreicher (2000)) but not, for example, for the shareholder relief system of Austria. See Züger 
and Matzka (1999) 
23 This is true under the assumption that no thin capitalisation rules effectively restrict interest 
deduction abroad. 
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corporation tax credit.24 The shareholders in question have to be resident in a 
jurisdiction with which the United Kingdom has a suitable tax treaty. Generally, 
such a treaty will permit the non-UK resident, for example a US investor, to receive 
a repayment equal to 0.027% of the net dividend paid by the UK company, if the 
non-UK resident holds at least 10% of the voting shares of the UK company which 
pays the dividend. Since the refund of a tax credit is in general advantageous for the 
investor and a tax credit is a typical element of an imputation system (and not the 
classical system or the shareholder relief system), multinational investors should 
check EU Member States using imputation systems whether the tax treaties in 
question include such provisions. In cases where no tax credit is granted, the 
European corporation tax systems operate as the classical system from the 
perspective of a multinational investor. 
 
 Another reason for dealing with the EU corporation tax systems in more detail is 
that tax regimes are generally designed as a whole. This means that there is a 
certain relationship between the tax rate, the tax base and the corporation tax 
system. Many tax reforms in the past including those to be discussed in more 
detail in Section V of Chapter C have shown that countries – in addition to the 
broadening of the tax base – tend to reduce the relief for corporation tax in order 
to compensate for the revenue loss in case of a lowering of the tax rates. The 
ratio behind this is that in case there are two independent bodies which are 
subject to taxation (i.e. the corporation and the shareholder), the nominal tax 
rates on each level can be lower than if only one body is effectively taxed (i.e. 
the shareholder). From the perspective of one country the same tax revenue can 
be collected with lower rates with the classical system or a shareholder relief 
system compared to an imputation system where, from an economic point of 
view, only the ultimate shareholder is subject to personal income tax on 
dividend income. As a broad conclusion, it seems reasonable to say that, in 
general, a lower corporation tax rate correlates with lower relief for corporation 
tax in case of distributions and vice versa.  
 
 From the point of view of a multinational investor, a lower relief for corporation 
tax is more convenient as a means for compensating for revenue losses than a 
broader tax base. The reason is that a reduced tax relief generally only burdens 
domestic investors whereas a broader tax base burdens both domestic and 
foreign investors. For example, in Germany, the abolition of the full imputation 
system and the introduction of a shareholder relief system in 2001 was 
accompanied by a reduction of the corporation tax rate from 40% (on retained 
earnings) and 30% (on distributed profits) to 25%.25 Therefore, the trend in the 
Member States to abolish imputation systems characterises a tax policy that 
                                                     
24 The UK treaty provisions originate from the time when a partial imputation system was applied 
domestically. Since the introduction of the shareholder system in 1999, the treaty tax credit has 
been reduced significantly and has almost no importance anymore. See Gammie (1998). 
25 At the same time, however, the depreciation rates were reduced. See Section V in Chapter C for 
a quantitative analysis of the effects of the German tax reform. 
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strengthens the international competitiveness of the tax systems by cutting back 
advantages for the resident tax payers. 
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II. ADDITIONAL (LOCAL) TAXES ON CORPORATE PROFITS AND 
CAPITAL 
 
Corporations might be subject to several other taxes in addition to corporation 
tax. The weight and importance of the additional taxes differs from country to 
country. For example, as we will see soon, in France and Germany additional 
taxes are of high relevance, in the Netherlands they are of low relevance. The 
structure of the additional taxes at the corporation level can be different. These 
taxes can be either independent from business yield (i.e. non-profit taxes) or 
related to the earnings of the company (additional profit taxes). The most 
important additional taxes are real estate tax, property tax and different kinds of 
trade taxes. 
 
Real estate, real property or land tax is levied by all EU Member States. The tax 
base covers land and buildings. Although this definition seems similar, some 
countries include in addition to buildings all assets that are effectively connected 
with the building (e.g. elevators, heating etc). Thus some countries tend to 
extend their land tax to a kind of property tax (e.g. the UK). For the computation 
of the tax base the assets are valued either at market prices or lower standard tax 
values (of the land and the building) or the rental value. As a consequence, even 
if the tax bases comprise the same elements their values can be completely 
different as - in general - the rental values are considerably lower than the 
market or standard values of land and buildings. Therefore, the comparison of 
tax rates is not sufficient to get an idea about the burden with real estate tax. As 
a general rule we can conclude that the tax rate might be higher in countries that 
tax the rental value as in countries that tax the market value (e.g. 47.4% in the 
UK compared to 1.55% in Germany) without having a significant impact on the 
nominal tax burden. Some countries, for example Greece, exempt companies 
from real estate tax if they use their own buildings. 
 
Additional property taxes covering real estate and business assets exist only as 
an exception at the corporation level. The only Member State that levies a 
property tax (net wealth tax) for companies is Luxembourg. However, in general 
there is no effective burden with property tax in Luxembourg since it can be 
credited against the corporation tax. 
 
Trade taxes are levied by several countries either on a profit basis (Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg), on a capital basis independent from the profits (France, 
Spain) or on a wage oriented basis (Austria, France). The tax bases for of these 
local trade and property taxes vary from country to country but are defined 
uniformly within one country. As far as non-profit taxes are concerned, in most 
cases they do not include intangibles, financial assets and inventories. Moreover, 
in most cases it is obvious that liabilities concerning the financing of the assets 
are not deductible from the tax base (gross tax base). 
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The tax rates for the various additional taxes are different and vary from country 
to country. Moreover, the tax rates differ within one country as local authorities 
or municipalities are entitled to set the tax rates. The effective tax rates used for 
our calculations are presented in Tables A.A.3 – A.A.4 of Appendix A.  
 
Table B.5 presents an overview on the additional taxes levied on corporations 
resident in the EU Member States. 
 
Table B.5: Local profit taxes and non-profit taxes  
in the Member States of the EU 
Country Kind of tax English expression 
Austria Grundsteuer / Bodenwertabgabe 
Kommunalsteuer 
Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Payroll tax 
Belgium Précompte immobilier Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Denmark Ejendomsskatter Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Finland Kiinteistöverolaki Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
France Taxe foncière 
Taxe professionnelle 
Taxes et participations assises sur 
les salaires 
Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Franchise tax on capital and payroll 
Payroll taxes 
Germany Grundsteuer  
Gewerbesteuer vom Ertrag  
Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Franchise tax on income 
Greece Telos akinitis periousias Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Ireland Business rates Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Italy Imposta communale immobiliare 
Imposta regionale sulle attività 
produttive 
Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Franchise tax on income (value 
added) 
Luxembourg Impôt foncier  
Impôt commercial 
Impôt sur la fortune 
Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Franchise tax on income 
Property tax 
Netherlands Onroerend-belasting Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Portugal Contribuição autárquica Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Spain Impuesto sobre bienes inmeubles 
Impuesto sobre actividades 
económicas 
Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
Franchise tax on capital 
Sweden Fastighetsskatt Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
United Kingdom Business rates Land / Real estate / Real property tax 
 
Referring to the number of additional taxes in each EU Member State the 
situation seems to be worst in France and in Luxembourg. This is not in line 
with the European trend of an abolishment of non-profit taxes on company’s 
capital in the past decade. For example, Austria abolished the trade tax on 
capital and on income, Germany abolished the trade tax on capital and property 
tax and Luxembourg abolished the trade tax on capital.  
 
In particular the French tax system can be characterised by an extremely high 
number of non-profit taxes. The "taxe professionnelle" and the employers' taxes 
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burden capital- and labour-intensive companies in particular: The tax base of the 
"taxe professionnelle" comprises 16% of the historical acquisition costs of 
tangible fixed assets and 18% of the payroll. Besides a general deduction of 16% 
there is no allowance for other deductions (e.g. debts). The average tariff is 
23%. Moreover, the total payroll is charged by the employers' taxes. Their 
nominal burden amounts to 2.45% of the payroll. Consequently the total burden 
of the payroll due to "taxe professionnelle" and employers' taxes is around 5.8%. 
However, in line with the above mentioned trend within the EU, France has 
announced to exempt the payroll gradually from the base of the „taxe 
professionnelle“ till the year 2003. 
 
 By contrast, Germany and Luxembourg levy high trade taxes on income. The 
average tax rate amounts to 17.63% in Germany and to 9.09% in Luxembourg. 
With respect to the effective statutory tax rates on profits, both countries belong 
to the top five of the country ranking.26 Since the corporation tax rates of both 
countries are below EU-average, an exclusive comparison of the corporation tax 
rates can be misleading when assessing the level of profit taxes in the EU 
Member States. 
 
 
                                                     
26 See Table A.A.1 of Appendix A. 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Altogether, the comparison of the company tax regimes of the EU Member States 
reveals that corporations are subject to several profit and non-profit taxes. The most 
important tax is the corporation tax. Although there exist some trends concerning 
the introduction of shareholder relief corporation tax systems and the gradual 
abolition of non-profit taxes in the past, the tax regimes of the EU Member States 
are far from being harmonised or co-ordinated. For example, the difference 
between the highest and the lowest corporation tax rates amounts to 27.67 
percentage points. Furthermore, there are considerable differences between the 
national corporation tax bases. It is questionable whether this situation is adequate 
for an economic and monetary union at the beginning of the third millennium. 
 
 Since the effects of the different taxes, tax rates and tax bases will differ according 
to the individual circumstances of a company, for example the types and structure 
of the assets, the sources of finance or the profit and loss situation, it is not possible 
to draw any universally valid conclusion about the effective levels of company 
taxation in the EU Member States. Moreover, with a qualitative assessment of the 
different elements of the tax regimes alone it is not possible to identify the impact 
of these elements on the level of the effective tax burden separately. For example, it 
is not possible to state whether different rules for the computation of taxable 
income (e.g. depreciation rates) will compensate for differences between the 
statutory tax rates or not. To express it differently: the qualitative assessment of the 
tax regimes supplies no idea about the weight and the impact of the different tax 
drivers in the level of the effective tax burden. 
 
 For a multinational investor – as for any investor – who wants to assess the EU 
Member States under tax considerations, it is therefore necessary to carry out a 
quantitative analysis of the company tax regimes. This will be the main task of the 
following Chapter C. 
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CHAPTER C 
 
EFFECTIVE LEVELS OF CORPORATE TAXES IN THE-MEMBER STATES OF 
THE EU 
 
 
I. METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to assess the possible effects of the tax regimes of the EU 
Member States on the decision of multinational companies with respect to the 
investment, financing and location of subsidiaries. This will be done by calculating 
effective marginal tax rates on domestic investment in each of the 15 EU Member 
States. From the perspective of a multinational investor, the computed tax burdens 
represent those of the subsidiaries located in the different EU Member States. 
However, no respect is given either to the levy of withholding taxes in the host 
country of the subsidiary nor to the taxation of dividend or interest income paid by 
the subsidiary to the parent in the home country of the parent company. However, 
as we have already argued in Section II of Chapter A, the tax burdens borne at the 
level of the subsidiaries already include the most relevant information. 
 
The methodology in this report closely follows the commonly used approach of 
King and Fullerton27 for the calculation of effective marginal tax rates. International 
studies of the OECD and the European Commission as well as an earlier report 
prepared by Baker & McKenzie in co-operation with the University of Mannheim 
on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Finance also applied this methodology.28 The 
main advantages of the King-Fullerton approach are its versatility and the 
possibility it offers to model the most relevant provisions of the tax codes, allowing 
the user to analyse the effects of different tax systems in a very systematic way. It is 
not intended to develop and explain the full scope of the model here. Since the 
model is described in detail in the earlier report of Baker & McKenzie (1999), we 
refer to Appendix A of this report. Instead, we just highlight the most important 
economic assumptions behind the model as well as the tax variables considered for 
the calculations. 
 
 The effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) is defined as the difference between the 
pre-tax real return (p) on a marginal investment and the post-tax real return (s) of 
the supplier of finance (generally a private investor) divided by the pre-tax real 
return (p).  
 
                                                     
27 See King and Fullerton (1984). 
28 See Commission of the European Communities (1992); OECD (1991); Baker & McKenzie 
(1999). 
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p
spEMTR −=  (1) 
 
Marginal investments are new additional  projects which yield a rate of return on 
the initially invested capital (equal to one unit) that is just sufficient to make the 
project worthwhile from the investor’s point of view. Since the company that 
carries out the investment has the legal structure of a corporation, the EMTR can be 
calculated in a separate step solely for the level of the corporation. Therefore, any 
personal taxes (e.g. income tax) or tax credits (e.g. corporation tax credit) are 
simply set to zero. The EMTR for the corporation (i.e. the so-called tax wedge for 
the investment) hence only depends on the relation between the pre-tax real return 
(p) and the nominal post-tax return (rn) of the corporation. In principle, this 
relationship can be solved either for a given pre-tax return or a given post-tax 
return. In order to understand the principle procedure of the calculation it is 
sufficient to concentrate for the moment only on profit taxes (τ) and the net present 
value of depreciation allowance (A). For a given post-tax return (fixed-r case) the 
value of the pre-tax return can be expressed as 
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where δ is the rate of economic depreciation and π  the inflation rate. On the 
other hand, the calculation can start with a given pre-tax return (fixed-p case) and 
then solve the equation for the value of the post-tax nominal return as follows 
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 In this report, we employ a uniform pre-tax real return for all projects, which is 
fixed at a rate of 10%.29 From equation (3), we can see that the value of the post-tax 
nominal return increases as the net present value of depreciation allowance (A) 
increases and the tax rate on corporate profits (τ) decreases 
( if A and than rn↑ ↓ ↑τ ). In other words: The effective marginal tax rate 
calculated just for the corporation level, expressed as the difference between the 
pre-tax and the post-tax return divided by the pre-tax return,30 
 
                                                     
29 Our procedure is commonly denoted as the fixed-p case. Studies using the so-called fixed-r case 
are Commission of the European Communities (1992); OECD (1991). For both cases see King 
and Fullerton (1984). 
30 Since the post-tax return of the corporation is equivalent to the pre-tax return of the private 
shareholder, this expression is equivalent to equation (1) in absence of all personal taxes (i.e. all 
personal taxes are set to zero). 
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 decreases as the net present value of depreciation allowance (A) decreases and 
the tax rate on corporate profits (τ) increases. 
 
 Equation (3) expresses the value of the post-tax nominal return in the case of 
equity-financing. Since, in the case of debt-financing, interest payments are 
deductible from the tax base of the corporation with its nominal value, this 
results in a tax saving. This tax saving increases the post-tax nominal return 
which then can be paid as an interest. Since rn from equation (3) is a post-tax 
value, the tax saving from interest deduction amounts to  
 
 ττ *1−
nr  (5) 
 
 This results in a modified post-tax return in the case of debt-financing of 
 
 τττ −=−+ 1*1
nn
n
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 which can be paid as an interest.31 
 
 The EMTR model covers the most relevant provisions of the tax regimes 
described in Chapter B above, different types of investment and sources of 
finance. These elements as well as the other assumptions of the model are 
described in more detail now. 
 
 Taxation: Attention is given to the most relevant tax provisions. We consider the 
corporation tax, other (local) profit taxes and non-profit taxes, tax rates, and the 
most relevant aspects of the tax bases (e.g. depreciation rules and valuation of 
inventories).32 However, the treatment of different types of investment income in 
the hands of the investor – the multinational parent company – is not taken into 
account (e.g. dividends, interest income and capital gains from the disposals of 
shares of the a subsidiary). The study uses information about the tax systems in 
operation as of 1 January 2001. One exception is Ireland. Since it has been already 
announced, we apply the 12.5% corporation tax rate which will become effective in 
Ireland in 2003.  
                                                     
31 Suppose a pre-tax return p of 10% and a corporation tax rate of say 40%. In the case of equity-
financing expressed by equation (3), this results in a post-tax return rn of 6% and thus a tax 
burden of 40%. In the case of debt-financing we expect a tax burden of zero and thus a post –tax 
return of 10%, since the pre-tax return is deducted as an interest. However, we arrive at the same 
result if we increase the post-tax return rn – which is 6% - by 1 / (1-0.4) as it is expressed by 
equation (6). 
32  Capital duty is not included in this study. 
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 The relevant information on the tax variables was derived from questionnaires 
which were answered from the country representatives of Baker & McKenzie. 
Several assumptions have to be made with respect to the use of tax electives (e.g. 
depreciation and valuation of inventories). Concerning the use of these tax 
electives, we always take the most tax efficient possibility. This means, if allowed, 
we use declining-balance instead of straight-line depreciation and LIFO instead of 
the FIFO or weighted average allocation. Details about the used tax data are set out 
in Appendix A. Compared to the elements of the national tax regimes we have 
analysed in Chapter B, it is clear that not all elements are included in the model. In 
particular, only a few items of the tax bases are taken into account. This should be 
kept in mind for the interpretation of the results. However, since the most essential 
features are incorporated, the results provide reliable estimates for the effective 
levels of company taxation in the EU Member States. 
 
 Assets and finance: As taxation varies with the assets and the financing 
possibilities, the EMTR depends upon the proportion of the marginal investment in 
each type of asset and the proportion of the company financing in each source of 
finance. Thus, the EMTR depends upon the particular industry and sector, 
respectively, as each industry can be characterised by a particular combination of 
assets and sources of finance. We examine five different assets: intangibles 
acquired from third parties, industrial buildings, machinery, financial assets and 
inventories. The financing policy considers three sources of finance: new equity 
capital, retained earnings, and debt. 
 
 There is a problem, as there is never a right set of weights for the assets and the 
financing possibilities. In order to be able to compare the effects that are solely 
attributable to the different national tax regimes, the same weights have to be used 
for all 15 EU-member states.33 We took the same data as in the earlier report of 
Baker & McKenzie. Therefore, in our base case we consider data for the 
manufacturing sector. The weights for the assets are 1.43% for intangibles, 12.99% 
for buildings, 17.49% for machinery, 38.25% for financial assets, and 29.84% for 
inventories. For the sources of finance, the weights are 10.08% for new equity, 
55.45% for retained earnings, and 34.47% for debt. For the personnel expenditure 
to turnover-ratio we assume 25.3%. When interpreting the results of the 
calculations, the reader has to bear in mind that these weights are not typical for 
each country. Comparing, for example, the sources of finance of a Dutch and a 
German corporation, one will notice differing weights for the financing 
possibilities. In order to avoid casuistry due to strict assumptions about the weights 
and in order to arrive at more universally valid results, we will use sensitivity 
analyses that show the impact of alternative weights for the assets and the financing 
possibilities on the EMTR. Moreover, the effect of specific weights on 12 other 
industries will be analysed.34 
                                                     
33 See King and Fullerton (1984), p. 281; OECD (1991), pp. 94-95. 
34 Industries and weights of the assets and of the financing possibilities are set out in Appendix B. 
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 Macroeconomic data: Thirdly, the EMTR for the type of assets will differ as a 
result of different capital allowance rates for tax purposes relative to the true 
economic depreciation rates and as a result of inflation. Our assumptions regarding 
the rates of true economic depreciation were taken from international surveys. The 
inflation rate used is 2%, which was the actual rate in the EU in the year 2000. 
Finally, the EMTR will depend upon the assumption regarding the pre-tax return 
(p), which is an indicator for the profitability of the investment. For the base case 
we fixed p at a rate of 10%. In order to analyse the impact of the pre-tax return on 
the EMTR, we again use sensitivity analyses, considering other values for the pre-
tax return (3, 6, 12 and 15%). 
 
 The most important assumptions of our study are summarised in Table C.1. 
 
Table C.1: Summary of most important assumptions 
Assumptions about taxes and tax bases 
Taxes Corporation tax including surcharges, local profit taxes, non-profit taxes 
Tax base (profit computation) Depreciation, stock valuation 
Assumptions about industry, assets and financing 
Industry Manufacturing sector as base case, sensiti-vity analysis with data for 12 other sectors 
Types of asset (weights in %) 
Intangibles (1.43), industrial buildings 
(12.99), machinery (17.49), financial 
assets (38.25), inventories (29.84) 
Sources of finance (weights in %) New equity (10.08), retained earnings (55.45), debt (34.47) 
Assumptions about depreciation, inflation, and pre-tax return 
True economic depreciation  
(always straight-line) 
Intangibles
12.5 years 
Buildings 
53 years 
Machinery 
11 years 
Lifetime for tax purposes  
where no year is specified 10 years 25 years 7 years 
Inflation rate 2% 
Pre-tax real return 10% sensitivity analysis with different values 
  
 The consideration of five types of assets and three sources of finance results in 15 
possible combinations of assets and financing, as set out in figure C.1. The effective 
tax burden at the shareholder's level is not considered separately here. Instead, by 
setting all personal taxes to zero, it is possible to isolate the effective tax burden at 
the corporation level. Altogether, we compute 15 single EMTR for the corporation 
level. In addition, keeping the comparison of the EMTR for all EU Member States 
manageable, we calculate the mean (weighted average) EMTR for each type of 
asset, each source of finance, and an overall mean EMTR for all combinations of 
assets and financing. 
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 Figure C.1: Combinations of types of assets and sources of finance  
 
 Before analysing the results for all 15 EU Member States, we discuss the 
interpretation of the EMTR in more detail, taking as an example a tax regime which 
is similar to the one in the Netherlands. The relevant tax variables are those which 
are presented in Appendix A for the Netherlands. In the following example it is first 
assumed that the inflation rate is zero.  
 
 Table C.2: Example for calculating the EMTR with a 10% pre-tax real return 
and zero inflation in the Netherlands 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial Assets Inventories 
Weighted 
average 
Finance       
New Equity 32.48 36.58 28.36 35.00 35.00 34.01 
Retained 
earnings 32.48 36.58 28.36 35.00 35.00 34.01 
Debt -3.88 2.44 -10.21 0.00 0.00 -1.52 
Weighted 
average  19.95 24.81 15.07 22.94 22.94 21.76 
  
 The results presented in Table C.2 should be interpreted as follows. For an 
investment in financial assets, yielding a given pre-tax real return of 10% and 
financed by issuing new share capital (= new equity), the EMTR is 35%. Thus, the 
EMTR just equals the Dutch statutory corporation tax rate of 35%, which does not 
come as a surprise, as no depreciation is allowed for financial assets. Taking 
financial assets as a benchmark, we observe that for machinery, financed in the 
same way, the EMTR is 6.64 percentage points lower and thus also lower than the 
corporation tax rate. The reason is that the assumed period for capital allowances 
for machinery for tax purposes (7 years) is shorter than the estimated period of true 
economic depreciation (11 years). This results in a tax saving, due to the 
BuildingsBuildings MachineryMachinery
CorporationCorporation
Shareholder
(Not considered here since all personal taxes are set to zero)
Shareholder
(Not considered here since all personal taxes are set to zero)
Debt Interest Equity Divi-
dend
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Earnings
Sales
of shares
5 types of assets
3 sources of finance
to be combined
in any way
= 15 cases
Financial
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Financial
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”accelerated” deduction of the costs of capital from the tax base. On the other hand, 
the EMTR for intangibles, although depreciable for tax purposes over a period of 
ten years, which is less than the estimated period of true economic depreciation 
(12.5 years), is only slightly lower (32.48%) than the statutory corporation tax rate. 
This indicates only a moderate tax saving resulting from the "accelerated" 
depreciation of the acquisition costs. The depreciation practice in the Netherlands is 
also not very generous for buildings (40 years). In addition, investments in 
buildings are subject to real estate tax (onroerende-zaakbelasting). Therefore, the 
EMTR for buildings in relation to other assets is highest in the Netherlands. Finally, 
the EMTR for inventories also equals the statutory corporation tax rate. Since 
inflation is assumed to be zero, there is no taxable inflationary gain which increases 
the EMTR although inventories are valued at weighted (average) costs in our 
example for the Netherlands. 
 
 If the corporation financed the same investments by retained earnings, the EMTR 
would be exactly the same. The reason is that dividends are not deductible from the 
tax base and there are no specific allowances for retained profits (e.g. a reduced 
corporation tax rate). By contrast, the EMTR would be close to zero or even 
negative, if the investments were financed by borrowing. The reason is, that in the 
case of borrowing, interest is deductible from the tax base with its nominal value. 
Deduction at the same rate for investments in financial assets that just yield the 
market pre-tax return interest, results in an EMTR equal to zero. Hence, the 
combination of interest relief and high capital allowances can result in an effective 
subsidy for marginal investments. In our example for the Netherlands, this is true 
for investments in intangibles and machinery. 
 
 The example for the Netherlands reveals, that the EMTR for investment in 
machinery is lowest, while the EMTR for buildings is highest. This is also obvious 
from the weighted average EMTRs we calculate in addition to the 15 EMTR. We 
compute weighted average rates for assets by summing up all EMTR involving a 
particular asset, multiplied by the weight of each source of finance (10.08% for new 
equity, 55.45% for retained earnings, and 34.47% for debt).35 It therefore seems 
reasonable to conclude that the taxation of machinery relative to other assets is 
most favourable. However, one should bear in mind that estimates of the EMTR for 
assets are highly sensitive to the assumptions made for true economic depreciation. 
Turning to finance, it can easily be seen from the weighted average rates for 
sources of finance, that debt financing is subject to the lowest EMTR, regardless of 
the precise asset. We compute weighted average rates for the sources of finance by 
summing up all EMTR involving a particular financing possibility, multiplied by 
the weight of each asset (1.43% for intangibles, 12.99% for buildings, 17.49% for 
                                                     
35 For example weighted average EMTR for machinery (15.07%) is the sum of EMTR/ machinery/ 
new equity * weight new equity (28.36 * 10.08% = 2.86%), EMTR/ machinery/ retained 
earnings * weight retained earnings (28.36 * 55.45% = 15.73%), and EMTR/ machinery/ debt * 
weight debt (-10.21 * 34.47% = -3.52%). 
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machinery, 38.25% for financial assets, and 29.84% for inventories).36 Overall, 
across all 15 asset and finance combinations, the weighted average effective 
marginal tax rate in our example is 21.76%. The overall weighted average EMTR is 
calculated by summing up each of the weighted 15 combinations of assets and 
finance. 
 
 The consideration of a positive inflation rate would have the following effects on 
the EMTR. Investment financed by new equity or retained earnings would bear a 
higher EMTR. The reason is that depreciation for tax purposes is based on the 
(historical) acquisition costs, while true economic depreciation is based on 
replacement costs. This results in an inflationary gain which is taxable. The same is 
true for inventories unless they are valued according to the LIFO method. On the 
other hand, the EMTR on investment financed by debt would fall. Since interest is 
deductible from the tax base always with its nominal value, the tax savings 
resulting from interest deduction increases with the inflation rate. The effects of 
inflation on the overall EMTR depend also on the assumptions about the weights 
for the assets and – in particular – for the sources of finance. In our example, the 
overall EMTR would fall moderately from 21.76% to 20.67% in case of an 
inflation rate of 2%. The number of 20.67% also represents the current overall 
EMTR for the Netherlands.37 
 
 Summing up, it seems reasonable to conclude, that tax systems can distort 
investment and financing decisions in many ways. The Dutch tax system, which 
we have chosen as an example, favours debt financing and investment in 
machinery. Hence, the EMTR will be highly sensitive to the sector of industry 
carrying out the investment. There are several reasons for this result. Tax driven 
distortions at the corporation level38 are caused by the corporation tax, the levy 
of additional profit and non-profit taxes, the tax rate structure, and the rules for 
profit computation. However, as shown in the following analysis, the situation 
demonstrated in our example for the Netherlands is not unique in Europe. 
Similar distortions can be found in all other EU Member States, although we 
will see that the reasons may differ. 
                                                     
36 For example weighted average EMTR for new equity (34.01%) is the sum of EMTR/ 
intangibles/ new equity * weight intangibles (32.48 * 1.43% = 0.46%), EMTR/ buildings/ new 
equity* weight buildings (36.58 * 12.99% = 4.75%), EMTR/ machinery/ new equity * weight 
machinery (28.36 * 17.49% = 4.96%), EMTR/ financial assets/ new equity * weight financial 
assets (35.00 * 38.25% = 13.40%), and EMTR/ inventories/ new equity * weight inventories 
(35.00 * 29.84% = 10.44%). 
37 See Table A.C.11 of Appendix for the results. 
38 If shareholders were included, distortions would also be caused by the corporation tax systems. 
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II. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON DOMESTIC INVESTMENTS TAKING 
THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR AS A BASE CASE 
 
1. Overall Tax Burdens of Corporations  
 
 One of the main purposes of this study is to examine the various EMTR in the 
15 EU Member States and to work out the main reasons for the differences. 
Table C.3 presents for each Member State the EMTR for the types of assets and 
sources of finance as well as an overall weighted average. The EMTRs were 
computed under the assumption of a pre-tax return (p) of 10%. The weights used 
for the combinations of assets and financing are those of our base case 
(manufacturing sector), which are set out in Table C.1. The EMTRs for the base 
case for all 15 possible combinations of assets and financing for each country 
are presented in Appendix C. 
 
 The EU-average overall EMTR, which is presented in the final column in Table 
C.3, amounts to 18.13%. The highest EMTR can be found in France (30.11%), 
followed by Germany (25.2%). Although seven Member States have an EMTR 
between 18% and 19%, there is still some variation between the EMTRs. Overall 
EMTR below 15% are calculated for three countries (Greece, Ireland and Italy), the 
value for Greece - amounting to 6.76% – being the lowest. Thus, we have an EU-
wide spread of 23.35 percentage points. The standard deviation amounts to 5.41. 
 
 This EU-wide spread cannot be explained by just one feature of the national tax 
regimes. In general, there is a strong relationship between the EMTR and the 
statutory tax rate on profits. Therefore, as presented in Table C.4, the ranking of the 
countries with respect to the statutory tax rate on profits serves as a good indicator 
for the country ranking with respect to the effective marginal tax rate. For example, 
Ireland, Sweden and Finland belong to the top five in both rankings, while 
Luxembourg and Germany belong to the last five in both rankings. However, there 
exist special features in many tax regimes which lead to a different order and 
therefore have to be stressed. Good examples are Austria, France, Greece and Italy. 
 
 Since France levies by far the highest amount of non-profit taxes it drops back 
from 10th position in the ranking of the statutory tax rates to the last place in the 
EMTR ranking. 
 
 Although Austria and – in particular – Italy apply high statutory tax rates on profits, 
their relative positions improve with respect to the EMTR ranking. The reason is 
the concept of the dual income tax prevailing in both countries.39 According to this 
concept, a deemed return that is allocated to the increase in the equity capital 
                                                     
39 The Austrian and Italian concepts of dual income tax are completely different from the dual 
income tax in the Nordic Countries, however. See Section II of Chapter B for a brief 
comparison. 
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presented in the annual accounts, is taxed at a lower rate. This tax rate mounts to 
25% in Austria (instead of 34%) and to 23.25% in Italy (instead of 41.25%).40 
 
 Finally, Greece taxes interest income of a corporation at a reduced rate of 15% 
compared to the ordinary corporation tax rate of 37.5%. 
 
 Although it is not clear from an economic point of view whether the Austrian and 
Italian types of dual income taxation should be qualified as a reduction of the tax 
rate or the tax base, the example of both countries and Greece again prove a certain 
dominance of the statutory tax rate in explaining the level of the effective tax 
burden. Since Austria also imposes a considerable amount of non-profit taxes, this 
effect is, however, less evident than in the two other countries. 
 
 The final row in Table C.3 shows the EU-average EMTR for assets and financing. 
The average EMTR for intangibles and machinery is quite similar (12.17% and 
13% respectively), whereas the taxation of the other assets is less generous. The 
treatment of buildings is worst (22.29%), closely followed by inventories (21%). 
With respect to the relative taxation of depreciable assets (intangibles, buildings 
and machinery) and inventories it is interesting to note that only four countries 
(France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) range above the EU-averages. The 
situation in France has already been explained by the levy of high non-profit taxes. 
Since the other countries do not levy such a considerable amount of non-profit 
taxes, their situation could be explained by relatively disadvantageous rules for 
profit determination (i.e. a relatively broad tax base) and limitations with respect to 
interest deductibility in the case of debt financing. Moreover, this could also 
explain why all three countries lose positions in the EMTR ranking compared with 
the ranking of the statutory tax rates on profits (see Table B.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
40 The numbers for Italy include local tax "IRAP" of 4.25%. 
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Table C.3: Effective Marginal Tax Rates in the EU Member States – base case – types of assets – sources of finance – overall 
 Average for each type of asset Average for each source of finance  
Country Intangibles Buildings Machinery 
Financial 
Assets Inventories New Equity 
Retained 
Earnings Debt 
Overall 
average 
Austria 20.92 17.65 16.60 18.73 18.73 29.64 29.64 -3.40 18.25 
Belgium 8.49 22.78 5.91 21.70 21.70 37.89 37.89 -17.24 18.89 
Denmark -17.73 31.35 14.82 16.70 20.15 31.84 31.84 -5.95 18.81 
Finland 18.23 17.93 14.31 16.19 22.80 30.67 30.67 -5.82 18.09 
France 14.11 42.67 33.00 25.40 29.76 44.94 44.94 1.92 30.11 
Germany 13.34 28.18 21.83 25.75 25.75 38.89 38.89 -0.82 25.20 
Greece 23.40 3.22 6.43 -6.72 24.96 26.16 26.16 -30.14 6.76 
Ireland 7.97 20.42 5.58 7.21 9.83 14.62 14.62 -0.43 9.43 
Italy 2.73 16.37 -1.03 20.20 13.51 27.00 27.00 -11.46 13.74 
Luxembourg 7.95 22.26 11.88 20.42 20.42 36.27 36.27 -13.87 18.98 
Netherlands 21.88 24.00 16.62 19.22 23.37 36.22 36.22 -8.90 20.67 
Portugal 22.00 16.72 14.34 19.32 19.32 34.21 34.21 -12.39 18.15 
Spain 21.88 21.96 11.70 19.22 19.22 34.22 34.22 -11.97 18.30 
Sweden 4.77 15.78 6.30 15.67 21.83 28.05 28.05 -7.70 15.73 
United Kingdom 12.67 33.02 16.73 16.70 23.59 33.59 33.59 -3.44 20.83 
EU-Average 12.17 22.29 13.00 17.05 21.00 32.28 32.28 -8.77 18.13 
Standard deviation 10.38 8.82 7.82 7.72 4.65 6.74 6.74 7.78 5.41 
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Table C.4: Effective Marginal Tax Rates and statutory tax rates on profits 
in the EU Member States - base case 
Country Overall 
average 
EMTR 
 
Ranking 
Country Statutory 
tax rate on 
profits *) 
 
Ranking 
Greece 6.76 1 Ireland 12.50 1 
Ireland 9.43 2 Sweden 28.00 2 
Italy 13.74 3 Finland 29.00 3 
Sweden 15.73 4 Denmark 30.00 4 
Finland 18.09 5 United Kingdom 30.00 4 
Portugal 18.15 6 Austria 34.00 6 
Austria 18.25 7 Netherlands 35.00 7 
Spain 18.30 8 Spain 35.00 7 
Denmark 18.81 9 Portugal 35.20 9 
Belgium 18.89 10 France 36.43 10 
Luxembourg 18.98 11 Luxembourg 37.45 11 
Netherlands 20.67 12 Greece 37.50 12 
United Kingdom 20.83 13 Germany 39.35 13 
Germany 25.20 14 Belgium 40.17 14 
France  30.11 15 Italy 41.25 15 
EU-Average 18.13  EU-Average 33.39  
Standard deviation 5.41  Standard deviation 6.84  
*) See 5th column from Table A.A.1 in Appendix A 
 
 Looking at the EMTR for the sources of finance, we observe an equal treatment of 
new equity and retained earnings (32.28%). By contrast, debt financing is treated 
far more generously, resulting in a EMTR of –8.77%. Thus, the favourable 
treatment of debt financing, as a result of the deductibility of interest expenses at 
nominal value, explains to a great extent the fact that the overall average EMTR in 
all countries is lower than the EMTR for new equity and retained earnings, 
respectively.41 However, these average numbers hide a considerable variation 
within the EMTRs for the sources of finance. This variation depends on the level of 
the statutory corporation tax rate. The difference between the EMTR on equity and 
debt-financing amounts, for example, in Belgium (with a corporation tax rate of 
40.17%) to 55.13 percentage points. By contrast, this difference is significantly 
lower in Ireland (15.05 percentage points). This is the result of the low corporation 
tax rate (12.5%), which obviously limits the tax savings due to interest deduction. 
Therefore, in general, low tax rates tend to reduce dispersions whereas high tax 
rates tend to have higher dispersions.42 
 
                                                     
41 As explained in the example in Table C.2, another reason for this disparity could be generous 
rules for profit computation. 
42 The Member States applying a dual income tax concepts (Austria and Italy) also have low 
dispersions. 
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 Summing up, it seems likely to presume that in general both the level of the EMTR 
and the variation between the EMTRs are above all influenced by the statutory tax 
rate on profits. On the other hand, rules for the computation of taxable income and 
the levy of non-profit taxes do not seem to have a major impact on the overall 
EMTR. However, the examples of France with respect to the non-profit taxes and 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK with respect to the tax base as well as the 
country-wide spread in the rows showing EMTR for assets indicates that a more 
thorough analysis is necessary. 
 
 With respect to the considerable variation between the EMTR for assets and 
financing it is obvious that none of the EU tax regimes is neutral towards 
investment and financing decisions. In addition, there is a wide range among the 
national overall EMTR, resulting in a EU-wide tax differential. This tax differential 
can lead to distortions in location decisions in the European Union. 
 
 
2. Taxation of Different Types of Assets 
 
 According to the EU-average EMTR for assets, shown in the last row of Table C.3, 
intangibles and machinery are taxed quite similarly and generously, whereas the 
taxation of buildings, financial assets and inventories is less generous. Altogether, 
buildings bear the highest tax burden. 
 
 With regard to depreciable assets, we can see from the national EMTR, presented 
in columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table C.3, that the relative taxation of either intangibles or 
machinery is more generous than the taxation of buildings. One exception is 
Greece, where buildings are depreciated for tax purposes over a short period of 
only ten years. The EMTR for intangibles is lowest relative to other assets in six 
countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom), while investment in machinery is taxed at the relatively lowest rates in 
eight countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain). Intangibles in particular are treated most favourable when the lifetime 
for tax purposes is low. The immediate write-off in Denmark even results in a 
subsidy, due to the deductibility of interest.43 On the other hand, machinery is 
favoured in the case of comparatively high allowance rates, either due to a 
declining balance depreciation practice or to short taxable lifetimes.44 The 
combination of these factors results in comparatively low EMTR, as can be seen in 
the case of Belgium, Italy, and Sweden. 
 
 The reasons for the disadvantageous treatment of buildings are the comparatively 
long lifetimes for tax purposes45 – the lifetime is 33 years or more in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain – and the obligation to use straight-line depreciation method 
                                                     
43 See Table A.C.3 of Appendix C. 
44 See Table A.A.7 of Appendix A for data used in the calculations. 
45 See Table A.A.6 of Appendix A. 
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(except Finland and Sweden). Moreover, only investments in buildings bear an 
extra burden as a result of real estate tax, levied in all EU Member States. Real 
estate tax is comparatively high in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom.46 
 
 Looking at the columns in Table C.3, showing the EMTR for non depreciable 
assets, we can make a clear distinction between the taxation of financial assets and 
inventories. Except Italy, there is no country where the EMTR for financial assets 
exceeds the EMTR for inventories. The reason in Italy is the denial of the lower 
corporation tax rate under the concept of the dual income tax to interest income. In 
the other countries, EMTRs for both assets are only equal, if LIFO allocation can 
be applied for the inventories and taxation of inflationary gains is thus avoided.47 
The disadvantageous treatment of inventories is most evident in countries where 
FIFO is compulsory (Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) or where 
there is a weighted average method combined with high statutory tax rates (France). 
A further reason for the preferential treatment of financial assets in relation to 
inventories is that tax rates on interest income are lower, as is the case in Greece.48 
 
 With respect to the relative taxation of depreciable assets (intangibles, buildings 
and machinery) and inventories four countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom) range above the EU-averages. However, in addition to 
relatively disadvantageous rules for profit determination, this result can be 
explained by other features of the national tax regimes. France, although granting 
favourable depreciation for all assets, has a comparatively high EMTR on assets 
and evidently discriminates buildings and machinery in relation to intangibles. The 
reason for the high EMTR is the levy of high non-profit taxes (taxe professionnelle 
and employer taxes). Distortions between the assets are caused by the “taxe 
professionnelle”, which only includes tangible fixed assets. Other countries 
imposing non-profit taxes (besides real estate tax) are Austria and Luxembourg. 
But the tax bases in these two countries hardly differ with regard to the type of 
asset.49 Moreover, the property tax in Luxembourg constitutes no real tax burden, 
since it is creditable against corporation tax. Another reason for relatively high 
EMTRs on assets is the limitation with respect to interest deductibility in the case 
of debt financing (e.g. Germany caused by the trade tax, see below).  
 
 With respect to the depreciation practise for the different assets the relatively high 
standard deviation for intangibles indicates the biggest differences. By contrast, 
again with respect to the standard deviation from Table C.3, capital allowances on 
machinery seem to be broadly similar within the EU Member States. This would 
also mean that no further harmonisation would be necessary in this field. However, 
it is very difficult to draw broad conclusions as to the relative taxation of 
                                                     
46 See Table A.A.3 of Appendix A for data used in the calculations. 
47 See Table A.A.5 of Appendix A for the data used in the calculations. 
48 Greece taxes interest at a final rate of 15%. For details see Section II of Chapter B. 
49 Except buildings in Luxembourg. See Table A.A.3 of Appendix A for the tax data and Section 
III of Chapter B for a qualitative analysis. 
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depreciable and non depreciable assets. As we have already pointed out when 
introducing the example of the Dutch tax system (see Table C.2), estimates of the 
EMTR for depreciable assets are highly sensitive to the assumptions made for true 
economic depreciation. Moreover, no clear conclusion can be drawn across the 
countries. Although all countries favour either intangibles or machinery over either 
financial assets or inventories, there are 14 countries that favour either financial 
assets or inventories over either intangibles or buildings. There is therefore no 
common pattern in the relative taxation of assets, but that in none of the EU 
Member States, machinery is treated worst. 
 
 
3. Taxation of Different Sources of Finance 
 
 Table C.3 clearly indicates that, from the only perspective of the corporation, 
the most tax-efficient way of finance is debt. The major reason is that deduction 
of nominal interest payments from the corporation tax base significantly reduces 
the effective tax burden on investment financed through borrowing. 
 
In general, the advantage of interest deduction increases with the statutory tax 
rates on profits and vice versa. For example, the tax savings from interest 
deduction are relatively high in Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg. By contrast, 
countries with a relatively low statutory tax rate on profits such as Ireland only 
allow for a relatively minor interest relief. Therefore, the country ranking with 
respect to the EMTRs on debt-financing and the ranking with respect to the 
statutory tax rates on profits often reveals a reverse order (see Table C.5).  
 
Except in France, debt-financing is subsidised in all EU Member States since the 
EMTR on borrowing is negative.50 In certain countries, debt-financed 
investments are even heavily subsidised, if, relative to other countries, assets 
receive “accelerated” depreciation (e.g. Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Sweden). In 
the case of Greece, the heavy subsidy of debt financing is furthermore increased 
by the fact that investment income on financial assets is taxed at a flat and final 
rate of 15%, while corporate interest payments are still fully deductible at a rate 
of 37.5%. However, even if effective tax rates on profits are high (e.g. France, 
and Germany), there is no full relief for interest deduction when local profit 
taxes and non-profit taxes are taken into account. Germany, for example, only 
allows deduction from local business tax of half of the interest payments. In 
France, liabilities arising from debt financing are not deductible from either the 
base of “taxe professionnelle” or the base of “employer taxes” levied on the 
payroll. A similar situation prevails in Austria. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
50 This is, however, no special feature of the tax systems in the EU Member States. 
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Table C.5: Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Equity Financing and statutory 
tax rates on profits in the EU Member States - base case 
Country Average 
EMTR on 
debt 
financing 
 
Ranking 
Country Statutory 
Tax rate on 
profits *) 
 
Ranking 
Greece -30.14 1 Ireland 12.50 1 
Belgium -17.24 2 Sweden 28.00 2 
Luxembourg -13.87 3 Finland 29.00 3 
Portugal -12.39 4 Denmark 30.00 4 
Spain -11.97 5 United Kingdom 30.00 4 
Italy -11.46 6 Austria 34.00 6 
Netherlands -8.90 7 Netherlands 35.00 7 
Sweden -7.70 8 Spain 35.00 7 
Denmark -5.95 9 Portugal 35.20 9 
Finland -5.82 10 France 36.43 10 
United Kingdom  -3.44 11 Luxembourg 37.45 11 
Austria -3.40 12 Greece 37.50 12 
Germany -0.82 13 Germany 39.35 13 
Ireland -043 14 Belgium 40.17 14 
France  1.92 15 Italy 41.25 15 
EU-Average -8.77  EU-Average 33.39  
Standard deviation 7.78  Standard deviation 6.84  
*) See 5th column from Table A.A.1 in Appendix A 
 
 From the perspective of the corporation, financing through new equity and 
retained earnings is disadvantageous, as no deduction from the taxable base for 
the corresponding payments (dividends) is allowed. The effective tax burden for 
both forms of finance almost equal the effective tax rates on profits (see Table 
C.6), resulting in a EU-wide spread among EMTR on new equity and retained 
earnings of 30.32 percentage points. Of the EU Member States, France is 
currently in worst position, and Ireland – as a consequence of the by far lowest 
statutory tax rate of profits – in first place.  
 
 Referring to the close relation of the effective tax burden on new equity and 
retained earnings to the statutory tax rate on profits in most of the EU Member 
States, it can be concluded, that “normal” accounting rules for profit 
computation, in so far as they are considered in the model, in general do not 
have a great impact on the effective tax burden and on the ranking of the 
countries, as they only result in “timing differences”. On the contrary, it is likely 
that the different statutory tax rates on profits explain most of the differences of 
EMTRs on both forms of equity-financing between countries. Only those 
countries granting generous capital allowances for depreciable assets have an 
EMTR that is significantly lower than the effective tax rate on profits (e.g. 
Belgium and Greece). 
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Table C.6: Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Equity Financing and statutory 
tax rates on profits in the EU Member States - base case 
Country Average 
EMTR on 
equity 
financing 
 
Ranking 
Country Statutory 
Tax rate on 
profits *) 
 
Ranking 
Ireland 14.62 1 Ireland 12.50 1 
Greece 26.16 2 Sweden 28.00 2 
Italy 27.00 3 Finland 29.00 3 
Sweden 28.05 4 Denmark 30.00 4 
Austria 29.64 5 United Kingdom 30.00 4 
Finland 30.67 6 Austria 34.00 6 
Denmark 31.84 7 Netherlands 35.00 7 
United Kingdom  33.59 8 Spain 35.00 7 
Portugal  34.21 9 Portugal 35.20 9 
Spain  34.22 10 France 36.43 10 
Netherlands  36.22 11 Luxembourg 37.45 11 
Luxembourg 36.27 12 Greece 37.50 12 
Belgium  37.89 13 Germany 39.35 13 
Germany 38.89 14 Belgium 40.17 14 
France  44.94 15 Italy 41.25 15 
EU-Average 32.28  EU-Average 33.39  
Standard deviation 6.74  Standard deviation 6.84  
*) See 5th column from Table A.A.1 in Appendix A 
 
 Two groups of countries differ from the average. The first group consists of 
countries that impose high non-profit taxes, for example Austria and in 
particular France. In France, this results in a marginal effective tax rate on 
equity financing which is far above the statutory tax rate on profits. In Austria, 
this disadvantage is compensated for by a great extent by the effects of dual 
income tax, which was introduced in 2000. 
 
Dual income tax is characterised by a generous taxation of equity financing. It 
also exists in Italy (in force since 1998) and explains why the Italian EMTR is 
significantly lower than the statutory tax rate. Under the dual income tax, profits 
that correspond to the increase of the equity capital of a company are taxed at 
lower corporation tax rates. In Austria, the flat rate is 25% instead of 34% and in 
Italy the special flat rate amounts to 19% instead of 37%.51 The concept of the 
dual income favours self-financing through retention of profits and the issue of 
new share capital over debt financing. 
                                                     
51 With respect to the local business tax "IRAP", the relevant tax rates rise from 19% to 23.15% 
and from 37% to 41.25%. Moreover, the aggregate total corporation tax rate can never be lower 
than 27%. We used the 27% instead of the 19%-rate for our calculation in the case of equity 
financing (= new equity and retained earnings). See Table A.A.2 in Appendix A for the data. 
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 From the perspective of a multinational investor, the country ranking with 
respect to the EMTRs on debt-financing indicates the relative advantages of 
countries in the case that this particular source of finance is used. This does not 
mean, however, that either debt financing is more tax efficient than equity 
financing nor that the attraction of the EU Member States as a place of location 
for a subsidiary has changed compared to the ranking with respect to the overall 
EMTR. Since interest receipts from a subsidiary are subject to corporation tax in 
the home state of the parent company and there is often no further tax52 on 
dividends at the parent's level, the multinational investor always has to compare 
the aggregate tax burden on interest and repatriated profits. 
 
 
                                                     
52 This could be true since foreign dividends are either exempt from taxation at the parent's level or 
a tax credit is granted for the underlying foreign corporation tax. In addition, however, in the 
case of equity financing, withholding taxes on dividends have to be taken into account. 
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III. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
 The computation of the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) depends on several 
assumptions. The model of King and Fullerton which is used here is, for example, 
based on an assumed pre-tax return of the investment of 10%. Moreover, with 
respect to the differing tax burdens for the assets and company finance, the overall 
weighted average effective marginal tax rates depend to a great extent on the 
assumptions for the weights for the types of assets and sources of finance. Finally, 
with respect to non-profit taxes in Austria and France which include payroll in their 
bases, the level of the personnel intensity is another important element constituting 
the effective tax burden. 
 
 For these reasons, no universally valid value for both the level of the EMTR and 
the variation between the EMTR across countries exist. In order to demonstrate the 
impact of these assumptions on the EMTR and also to verify the conclusions from 
the previous Section for our base case, this Section recalculates EMTRs for 
different pre-tax returns, personnel intensities as well as different weights for the 
types of assets and sources of finance. 
 
 
1. Differing Assumptions for the Rate of Return 
 
 The level of the effective marginal tax rate depends on the assumed value for the 
pre-tax real return (p) of the company. There are at least three reasons for this 
dependence.53 First, the relative weight of non-profit taxes in the effective tax 
burden depends on the pre-tax return. As a general rule, the impact of the non-profit 
taxes decreases with an increasing pre-tax return. Second, under the assumption of 
a constant inflation rate, the relative advantage of debt financing (i.e. the tax 
savings) resulting from the deduction of interest with its nominal value depends on 
the level of the pre-tax return. In case of inflation the advantage from interest 
deduction decreases with an increasing pre-tax return. Third, the present value of 
depreciation allowances depends non-linearly on the pre-tax return used for 
discounting. Since the impact of the pre-tax return on the present value of 
depreciation allowances is not clear, the impact of the non-profit taxes and the 
interest deduction remain. However, both variables have different effects on the 
EMTR in case of an increasing pre-tax return: while a reduced weight of non-profit 
taxes decreases the EMTR, a lower advantage from interest deduction increases the 
EMTR. Therefore, it is possible that both effects compensate against each other. 
 
 In order to find out whether our estimates for the EMTR are relatively robust for 
the assumptions made for the pre-tax return (10%) or not, we have recalculated the 
EMTR by gradually altering the value for the pre-tax real return from 3% to 15%. 
The results of this sensitivity analysis are presented in Table C.7 and Figure C.2. 
 
                                                     
53  See also King and Fullerton (1984), pp. 282-290. 
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Table C.7: Effective Marginal Tax Rates and variation of pre-tax return  
 Pre-tax return % Relative 
Country 3 6 10 
Base case 
12 15 difference 
from 3% to 
15% in 
percentage 
points 
Austria 26.69 20.42 18.25 17.78 17.37 -9.32 
Belgium 14.44 17.22 18.89 19.44 20.09 5.65 
Denmark 23.18 19.79 18.81 18.65 18.53 -4.65 
Finland 20.37 18.58 18.09 18.02 17.99 -2.38 
France 55.37 36.84 30.11 28.57 27.13 -28.24 
Germany 21.13 23.80 25.20 25.62 26.10 4.97 
Greece 1.35 4.89 6.76 7.35 8.03 6.68 
Ireland 14.06 10.64 9.43 9.17 8.92 -5.14 
Italy 6.78 11.54 13.74 14.37 15.04 8.26 
Luxembourg 13.45 17.12 18.98 19.54 20.17 6.72 
Netherlands 18.82 19.94 20.67 20.91 21.19 2.37 
Portugal 13.44 16.55 18.15 18.64 19.18 5.74 
Spain 12.98 16.56 18.30 18.81 19.36 6.38 
Sweden 15.80 15.53 15.73 15.85 16.03 0.23 
United Kingdom 30.64 23.40 20.83 20.24 19.70 -10.94 
EU-Average 19.23 18.19 18.13 18.20 18.32 -0.91 
Standard deviation 11.99 6.88 5.41 5.15 4.95  
Figure C.2: Effective Marginal Tax Rates and variation of pre-tax return  
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 From the final row in Table C.7 we see that the EU-average EMTR begins to 
fall as the value for the pre-tax real return increases from 3% to 10%. However, 
after having reached a critical level of 10% the EU-average EMTR tends to 
increase again. Altogether, there is a total decrease of 0.91 percentage points. 
Moreover, if we assume a high value for the pre-tax return, the variation 
between the EMTRs in the Member States is reduced significantly, since the 
standard deviation is falling to 4.95. 
 
 However, the trend of the EU-average EMTR hides relevant information from 
the trends in the different Member States. There is one group of six countries 
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland and the United Kingdom) with a 
falling trend. The nine Member States which remain have a rising trend. 
Therefore, within the EU Member States, the advantage of a lower impact of 
non-profit taxes and the disadvantage of a benefit from interest deduction 
compensate against with reversed premises. 
 
 The countries with falling EMTRs above all are those which levy high real 
estate taxes (Ireland and the United Kingdom) or additional high non-profit 
taxes (Austria and France). On the other hand we see, that the EMTR in 
particular in France will be far above the EU-average as the pre-tax return is 
falling, because non-profit taxes then constitute a relatively high fraction of a 
very small pre-tax return. 
 
 By contrast, EMTRs increase above all in those countries which levy relatively 
low non-profit taxes and where the relief for interest deduction is relatively high 
in the base case. In case of an increasing pre-tax return the benefit from 
deducting interest with the nominal value (i.e. the constant inflation rate) 
becomes a smaller fraction of the pre-tax return. The best example is Italy with 
an increasing EMTR of 8.26 percentage points. This considerable dispersion can 
also be attributed to some extent to the dual income tax. 
 
 The most striking result from this variation is, however, that the EMTR across 
the Member States converge, but do not cross, as the pre-tax return increases. 
Beyond some critical value of the pre-tax return - we may refer to the 10% from 
the base case as an example – the EMTR are not much affected by further 
changes in the value of the pre-tax return. Hence, our standard assumptions with 
respect to the pre-tax return clearly reflect the differences among the EMTR 
across the EU Member States. Moreover, although the value of the pre-tax 
return does affect the absolute value of the effective tax burden, the changes in 
the EMTR-ranking of the countries are negligible. With the exception of the 
United Kingdom, no country is moving by more than two positions. 
 
 
Baker & McKenzie 
 55
2. Different Assumptions for the Personnel Intensity 
 
 The approach of King and Fullerton does not consider labour costs for the 
calculation of effective marginal tax rates. As labour costs are fully tax 
deductible, similar to interest costs, they do not influence the effective marginal 
tax rate. As a result, the EMTR on labour costs is always equal to zero. 
 
 It is obvious that, in relation to the net labour costs, the value of the deductibility 
of labour costs will depend on the amount of the tax saving due to the 
deductibility. As a general rule, a company’s net labour costs will decrease with 
an increase of the statutory tax rate on profits. Thus, assuming equal gross 
wages in all EU Member States, net labour costs will be lowest in countries 
where the statutory tax rates on profits are highest (e.g. Belgium and Germany). 
 
Table C.8: Effective Marginal Tax Rates and variation of personnel intensity 
 Personnel intensity % 
Country 
Base case 
(25.3) 
90 50 10 
Austria 18.25 33.55 24.08 14.64 
Belgium 18.89 Same as base case 
Denmark 18.81 Same as base case 
Finland 18.09 Same as base case 
France 30.11 42.29 34.75 27.23 
Germany 25.20 Same as base case 
Greece 6.76 Same as base case 
Ireland 9.43 Same as base case 
Italy 13.74 Same as base case 
Luxembourg 18.98 Same as base case 
Netherlands 20.67 Same as base case 
Portugal 18.15 Same as base case 
Spain 18.30 Same as base case 
Sweden 15.73 Same as base case 
United Kingdom 20.83 Same as base case 
EU-Average 18.13 19.96 18.83 17.70 
Standard deviation 5.41 8.43 6.32 5.08 
 
On the other hand, referring to Austria and France, two EU Member States levy 
taxes on the payroll of a company, other than wage taxes or social security 
contributions. In order to include these taxes we have extended the model of 
King and Fullerton correspondingly. In particular we considered 
“Kommunalsteuer” (municipal tax) in Austria and “taxe professionnelle” as well 
as employer taxes in France. The Austrian municipal tax is levied on all wages 
at a rate of 3%. In France, the nominal tax rate on all wages amounts to 5.8% 
approximately. For the assessment of the impact of payroll taxes on the effective 
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tax burden, we calculated the EMTR by gradually changing the value for the 
personnel intensity from 90% to 10%. For the base case we assumed a personnel 
intensity of 25.3%. 
 
 Referring to the results presented in Table C.8, we can conclude that 
assumptions for the personnel intensity have a large impact on the EMTR in 
Austria and France, respectively. A rise of the personnel intensity from 10% to 
90% would increase the Austrian EMTR by 129%; the corresponding increase 
in France would be 55.3%. Unlike France, which is in general a high tax country 
and therefore always is in a bad relative position, Austria would move in the 
EMTR-ranking of the EU Member States by three positions. Thus, the estimate 
of effective marginal tax rates has to consider labour costs as a relevant factor. 
Altogether, it seems reasonable to conclude that labour-intensive industries face 
disadvantageous tax rules in Austria and France. The French tax rules in 
particular, are far from ideal from an economic point of view. With regard to 
“taxe professionnelle” and employer taxes, we can state that both capital- and 
labour-intensive industries are bearing high EMTR in France. However, the 
French government has announced to abolish payroll from the base of the “taxe 
professionnelle” until the year 2003. 
 
 
3. Different Weights for the Assets 
 
 The analysis of the taxation of the different types of assets in Section II. 2 of this 
Chapter revealed that there is no common pattern in the relative taxation of assets 
across the EU Member States. However, each country shows more or less obvious 
differences in the tax treatment of the different assets considered in this study. This 
Section therefore investigates the impact of the weights for the assets on the 
average EMTR in the Member States as well as on the spread of the average 
EMTRs across Member States. We changed the weights by gradually reducing the 
fixed assets to total balance sheet-ratio from 90:10 to 10:90. In other words, this 
variation takes into account a reduction in the firm’s capital intensity. The weights 
used in this variation are presented in Table A.B.3 of Appendix B. 
 
 As presented in the final rows in Table C.9, a reduction in the capital intensity from 
90:10 to 10:90 would cause only a slight decrease in the EU-average overall EMTR 
of 0.72 percentage points. If one refers to the EU-average EMTR, one could 
therefore conclude that the capital intensity or the relation of buildings and 
machinery to intangibles, financial assets and inventories had almost no impact on 
the tax burden.  
 
 However, the average EU figures again hide a lot of individual information. If we 
refer to the development of the national EMTR, the impact of a decreasing capital 
intensity is quite different. Three countries (Greece, Italy and Portugal) show 
increases in the EMTR in excess of 3 percentage points. By contrast, we can see a 
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reduction of more than 10 percentage points in France and Denmark. There are 
several reasons for the high rates of increase and decrease in the EMTR. 
 
Table C.9: Effective Marginal Tax Rates and variation of fixed assets  
to total balance sheet-ratio 
Country Fixed assets to total balance sheet-ratio Relative difference  
 90 : 10 50 : 50 10 : 90 from 90:10 to 10:90 in 
percentage points 
Austria 17.36 18.29 19.23 1.87 
Belgium 14.64 15.82 17.00 2.36 
Denmark 21.41 14.73 8.05 -13.36 
Finland 16.42 17.60 18.78 2.36 
France 36.36 30.46 24.56 -11.80 
Germany 24.66 23.31 21.95 -2.71 
Greece 5.73 9.35 12.98 7.25 
Ireland 12.53 10.67 8.80 -3.73 
Italy 8.12 9.91 11.70 3.58 
Luxembourg 16.99 16.67 16.34 -0.65 
Netherlands 20.43 20.90 21.38 0.95 
Portugal 16.00 17.87 19.75 3.75 
Spain 17.16 18.47 19.78 2.62 
Sweden 11.35 12.57 13.78 2.43 
United Kingdom 24.15 21.27 18.38 -5.77 
EU-Average 17.55 17.19 16.83 -0.72 
Standard deviation 7.19 5.38 4.68  
 
Figure C.3: Effective Marginal Tax Rates and variation of fixed assets to total 
balance sheet-ratio 
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 First, one reason can be seen in the shift from a more generous capital allowance 
practice to less generous rules for intangibles and non depreciable assets and vice 
versa. For example in the case of Denmark,54 the reduction of the EMTR is caused 
by the higher weight of the tax reduction due to the immediate write-off of 
intangibles. Second, applying FIFO to inventories has a major impact on the 
effective tax burden, if capital intensity is falling (e.g. in the case of Finland and 
Greece). Third, the decrease of the EMTR in France, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom are caused by non-profit taxes. In the case of Ireland and the United 
Kingdom the reason is the lower impact of real estate tax (business rates) on 
buildings. The lower EMTR in France is explained by the lower impact of “taxe 
professionnelle”, which does not include intangibles, financial assets, and 
inventories as taxable assets. 
 
 We can conclude from the results that there is an impact of the depreciation 
practice on the tax burden if the rules are comparatively favourable, whereas an 
“average” depreciation practice in relation to other countries has almost no 
impact on the EMTR in the case of altering weights in the assets. Furthermore, 
non-profit taxes can distort investment decisions, if there is no uniform valuation 
and taxation of the different types of assets. The French rules in particular result 
in a discrimination of capital intensive production.  
 
 The most striking result from this variation is that the EMTR across the Member 
States converge with an decreasing capital intensity. Referring to the standard 
deviation presented in Table C.9, a lower capital intensity would reduce the 
variation between the EMTRs across Member States. This indicates – for the EU as 
a whole – a greater similarity in the taxation of non-depreciable assets compared to 
depreciable assets. As a result from the effects of depreciation, valuation of 
inventories and non-profit taxes which were described above, the exact country 
ranking with respect to the EMTR depends on the assumptions for the capital 
intensity. However, in general, the changes in the EMTR-ranking of the 
countries are only minor. With the exception of Denmark, Portugal and the 
United Kingdom no country moves by more than three positions. 
 
 
4. Different Weights for the Sources of Company Finance 
 
 The analysis of the taxation of the different sources of finance in Section II. 3 of 
this Chapter revealed that financing a company with debt capital is treated far more 
generously than financing with equity capital (i.e. issuing new equity capital and 
retaining profits). Referring to the different tax treatment of forms of finance, it 
seems likely that the EMTR at the level of a corporation is highly sensitive to 
the assumptions made for the weights of the different sources of finance. The 
aim of this Section is to investigate the impact on the average EMTR of 
                                                     
54 In Denmark the decrease of the EMTR is, like in Ireland and the UK, even higher since there is 
lower impact of the relatively high real estate tax. 
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changing assumptions for the weights of financing. Therefore, we recalculate 
EMTRs by gradually reducing the debt-equity-ratio of the corporation from 
90:10 to 10:90. The weights for the sources of finance are presented in Table 
A.B.3 of Appendix C. 
 
Table C.10: Effective Marginal Tax Rates and variation of debt-equity ratio 
Country Debt-equity ratio Difference from 
90:10 to 10:90 in 
 90 : 10 50 : 50 10 : 90 percentage points 
Austria -0.10 13.12 26.33 26.43 
Belgium -11.73 10.33 32.38 44.11 
Denmark -2.17 12.94 28.06 30.23 
Finland -2.17 12.42 27.02 29.19 
France 6.22 23.43 40.63 34.41 
Germany 3.15 19.03 34.91 31.76 
Greece -24.51 -1.99 20.53 45.04 
Ireland 1.07 7.09 13.12 12.05 
Italy -7.61 7.77 23.15 30.76 
Luxembourg -8.86 11.20 31.25 40.11 
Netherlands -4.39 13.66 31.70 36.09 
Portugal -7.73 10.91 29.55 37.28 
Spain -7.35 11.13 29.60 36.95 
Sweden -4.13 10.17 24.48 28.61 
United Kingdom 0.26 15.07 29.89 29.63 
EU-Average -4.67 11.75 28.17 32.84 
Standard deviation 7.10 5.42 6.19  
 
 As presented in the final rows in Table C.10, a reduction in the debt-equity ratio 
from 90:10 to 10:90 would cause a major increase in the EU-average EMTR of 
32.84 percentage points. Thus, if we refer to the EU-average EMTR, we can 
conclude that the debt-equity ratio has a major impact on the effective tax burden 
of corporations, which clearly shows a favourable treatment of debt-financing. 
 
Looking at the development of the EMTRs across the EU Member States, we 
see a common favourable treatment of debt relative to other forms of finance, 
due to the deduction of nominal interest payments from the corporation tax base. 
Since the tax saving from interest deduction is highest in countries with high 
statutory tax rates on profits, most countries applying high tax rates can improve 
their position in the country ranking when more debt capital is employed (e.g. 
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal). Belgium, for example, 
can improve from the thirteenth to the second position, which is the result of the 
high corporation tax rate. However, with reference to France and Germany, not 
all "high tax" countries benefit in the same way from debt financing. The 
reasons are that limitations for interest deduction (in Germany due to the trade 
tax) and non-profit taxes levied at a gross base (France) reduce the 
corresponding tax savings.  
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 By contrast, countries with a preferential taxation of equity-financing partly lose 
their comparative advantage when more debt capital is employed. For example, 
Italy, a country with a high statutory corporation tax rate, does not grant the 
same benefits to debt financing as other countries do, because dual income tax 
treats equity capital more generously than debt. A similar trend, which is also 
caused by the dual income tax, prevails in Austria. Another example for a 
country which grants only little relief to debt-financing is Ireland. Ireland would 
drop back from first place to the thirteenth position in the country ranking if the 
debt-equity ratio were risen from 10:90 to 90:10. This is the result of the by far 
lowest corporation tax rate among EU Member States.  
 
Figure C.4: Effective Marginal Tax Rates and variation of debt-equity ratio 
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the EMTR almost reveals a reverse order if the assumptions for the debt-equity 
ratio change from one to the other extreme. 
 
 It has to be stressed, however, that these are the conclusions from the only 
perspective of the corporation (e.g. a EU-subsidiary of a multinational investor). 
From the perspective of a multinational investor, the country ranking of the 
EMTRs assuming different debt-equity ratios only indicates the relative 
advantages of countries in the case that this particular mix of sources of finance 
is used. The ranking does not tell anything about the most tax efficient way of 
financing a subsidiary nor the attraction of the EU Member States as a host 
country for a subsidiary. Since interest receipts from a subsidiary are subject to 
corporation tax at the parent's level, the multinational investor always has to 
compare the aggregate tax burden on interest and repatriated profits,55 for 
example in the form of dividends. Another possibility of repatriating profits 
from the subsidiary to the parent company would be profit retention by the 
subsidiary and the subsequent disposal of the shares of the subsidiary. In many 
countries, a capital gain from the disposal of the shares is either exempt (i.e. the 
participation exemption applies) or taxed at reduced rates.56 
 
                                                     
55 For the case of a US-investor with subsidiaries in the 15 EU Member States see Spengel (1999). 
56 The disposal of shares is also included in the King-Fullerton model in the case of cross-border 
investment. See Baker & McKenzie (1999). 
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IV. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES FOR DIFFERENT BRANCHES AND 
INDUSTRIES 
 
 The results for the base case and the sensitivity analysis clearly evidence that 
there is no universally valid value for the EMTR in one country. Neither, 
therefore, is it possible to make universally valid statements regarding the 
differences of the EMTR across the EU Member States. The reason is that the 
impact on the EMTR of different assumptions, made for the weights of the types 
of assets and the sources of finance and for the personnel intensity, is not the 
same in each country. 
 
 In order to investigate the impact of alternative weights for assets, forms of 
finance, and personnel intensity, this Section calculates the EMTR of 12 other 
industries, in addition to the base case which referred to data from the 
manufacturing sector. The weights for the combinations of assets and finance 
that are used for the calculation, are presented in Table A.B.2 of Appendix B. In 
order to isolate the impact of the weights for the combinations of assets and 
finance on the EMTR, we considered a uniform pre-tax real return (p) of 10% 
for each industry. 
 
 The two final rows in Table C.11 show that, depending on the industry, the overall 
EU-average EMTR can vary between –0.53% for Transport and 22.55% for 
Chemical Engineering. Furthermore, compared to the base case, there can be either 
less or more variation between the EMTRs depending on the specific sector. For 
example, standard deviation amounts to 4.21 for High Tech industries or 4.34 for 
Commerce only, whereas it can rise to 9.1 for Transport. We do not intend to 
comment on the EMTR of each industry. We just want to draw attention to some 
typical industries where the EMTRs are significantly lower or higher than the 
EMTR in our base case. We therefore refer to Chemical Engineering and 
Automotive Vehicles on the one hand and to Commerce and Transport on the other 
hand.  
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Table C. 11: Effective Marginal Tax Rates for selected branches and industries 
Country 
Base Case 
Manufac-
turing 
sector 
Metal 
Production
Chemical 
Enginee-
ring 
Enginee-
ring 
Electrical 
Enginee-
ring 
Automo-
tive 
Vehicles 
Food and 
Beverages 
Building 
and Cons-
tructions 
Commerce Transport Service 
Trade 
Low Tech High Tech Average 
of 12 
industries 
Austria 18.25 14.22 22.46 15.21 18.94 20.02 11.12 10.33 2.56 3.77 18.06 4.95 7.07 12.39 
Belgium 18.89 13.22 25.41 11.26 18.42 21.70 11.88 3.66 1.41 -10.00 7.13 3.47 8.16 9.64 
Denmark 18.81 15.75 22.42 14.19 18.20 21.46 14.68 8.35 7.11 5.57 9.21 10.39 11.46 13.23 
Finland 18.09 14.84 21.68 14.06 17.93 20.15 13.88 9.70 7.60 -0.13 9.21 9.27 11.66 12.49 
France 30.11 26.28 34.64 26.00 29.93 33.27 23.59 18.56 12.61 18.99 25.08 18.03 18.81 23.82 
Germany 25.20 21.76 29.79 19.43 24.63 27.63 20.57 13.33 12.01 7.50 15.89 14.80 16.30 18.64 
Greece 6.76 2.39 9.96 4.52 7.22 10.15 1.15 1.04 -4.57 -21.67 -9.36 -2.83 1.51 -0.04 
Ireland 9.43 7.99 10.89 7.92 9.00 10.44 8.25 5.20 5.28 5.32 6.50 6.99 8.65 7.70 
Italy 13.74 9.20 19.43 8.02 13.41 15.32 8.37 3.51 2.05 -7.01 6.27 2.49 6.82 7.32 
Luxembourg 18.98 14.32 24.86 11.82 18.38 21.84 12.94 4.43 2.62 -5.00 7.68 5.49 8.34 10.64 
Netherlands 20.67 16.70 25.59 14.90 20.11 23.34 15.70 8.46 6.76 0.16 10.25 9.73 12.35 13.67 
Portugal 18.15 13.98 23.79 11.28 17.57 20.80 12.67 4.37 2.70 -4.74 7.64 5.53 7.85 10.29 
Spain 18.30 13.93 23.90 11.67 17.63 20.88 13.00 4.58 3.28 -3.52 8.46 6.18 9.35 10.78 
Sweden 15.73 12.02 19.17 12.01 15.86 17.44 10.99 8.42 5.84 -4.67 7.27 6.20 9.66 10.02 
United Kingdom 20.83 17.69 24.31 16.91 20.21 23.27 17.27 11.37 10.30 7.48 12.13 13.53 15.92 15.87 
EU-Average 18.13 14.29 22.55 13.28 17.83 20.51 13.07 7.69 5.17 -0.53 9.43 7.61 10.26 11.76 
Standard deviation 5.41 5.37 6.02 4.95 5.29 5.65 5.11 4.41 4.34 9.10 7.11 5.05 4.21 5.19 
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 In relation to the base case, the EU-average EMTR and the overall average EMTR 
for Chemical Engineering and Automotive Vehicles are higher in each country. The 
reason is that the specific structure of the weights for assets and for the forms of 
finance is less tax-favourable than in the base case. Both industries have a high 
portion of equity in the sources of finance,57 resulting in a limited tax advantage 
from debt financing. Moreover, a comparison of the tax burden of Chemical 
Engineering with the tax burden of Automotive Vehicles shows a higher EMTR for 
Chemical Engineering, due to the higher portion of financial assets in the total 
assets (about 51%, compared to 35% for Automotive Vehicles). Hence, the 
advantages from the depreciation allowances are also limited in the case of 
Chemical Engineering. 
 
 On the other hand – in relation to the base case –, the EU-average EMTR and the 
overall EMTR for Commerce and Transport are significantly lower in each country. 
Referring to Transport, the weights for both assets (fixed assets to total balance 
sheet-ratio about 84%) and forms of finance (debt-equity-ratio about 78%) are “tax 
efficient”, resulting in the lowest EU-average EMTR. The EMTR for Transport is 
also lowest in each country. The EU-average EMTR for this industry is even 
negative (-0.53%) since only the level of the corporation is considered and, hence, 
no respect is given to the tax levied on interest payments from the subsidiary at the 
parent’s level. In the case of Greece and Belgium, the high level of debt financing, 
combined with favourable depreciation allowances for fixed assets, even results in 
a heavy subsidy of debt-financing, pushing down the overall EMTR below –10%. 
 
 Commerce also has a high portion of debt in the sources of finance (about 68%), 
keeping down the overall EMTR. On the other hand, the portion of inventories in 
the types of assets is comparatively high (about 53%), resulting in a higher EMTR 
relative to Transport, since the advantages of the benefit from capital allowances 
for depreciable assets are limited. 
 
 The comparison of the effective tax burden of high tech and low tech industries 
shows, both for the overall EU-average EMTR and for the EMTR in each EU 
Member State, a more generous treatment of Low Tech in relation to High Tech 
industries from a tax point of view. Since both industries have about the same debt-
equity-ratio (Low Tech industry about 60% and High Tech industry about 58%), 
the reason for the different overall EMTR is that the weights for depreciable assets 
differ. Whereas fixed assets to total balance sheet-ratio in the Low Tech industry 
amounts to about 47%, the corresponding ratio in the High Tech industry is only 
about 30%. On the other hand, High Tech industry has a higher portion of 
intangibles and inventories, altogether resulting in a lower benefit from capital 
allowances for depreciable assets. 
 
 Finally, referring to the ranking of the countries from the highest to the lowest 
                                                     
57 The debt-equity ratios are 29.11% for Chemical Engineering and 39.19% for Automotive 
Vehicles. See Table A.B.2 of Appendix B. 
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EMTR, we can draw the following conclusions. If - compared to the base case - 
the portion of non-depreciable assets and the portion of equity financing is high, 
the ranking of the countries is hardly affected. If instead the portion of 
depreciable assets and the portion of debt financing is high, the ranking of the 
countries does change. In particular countries granting generous capital 
allowances and high relief for debt-financing improve their ranking (e.g. 
Belgium, and Luxembourg). Altogether, however, except Belgium which 
improves by six positions, Luxembourg, which improves by four positions, and 
Finland, which loses five positions, there are only minor changes in the ranking, 
if we compare the base case with the average of the 12 industries (presented in 
the last column of Table C.11). Therefore, the base case makes a good 
assumption about the ranking of the EMTR in the EU Member States. 
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V. CHANGES OF THE EFFECTIVE TAX RATES SINCE 1998 
 
 This Section summarises the main tax reforms in the EU Member States and 
their effects on the effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) for companies. In our 
analysis we refer to the period 1998-2001. Based on the economic assumptions 
for our base case,58 we recalculate the EMTR for the fiscal years 1998, 1999 and 
2000. Like in the previous sections we only consider elements of the tax regimes 
that are generally available for the manufacturing sector.59 This excludes, above 
all, special investment incentive schemes. Moreover, since this report is 
addressed to multinational investors, we do not consider changes of the personal 
income tax regimes. 
 
 The results are summarised in Table C.13 and in Figure C.5.60 Within the EU, 
seven Member States have reduced the EMTR for corporations (Austria, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Portugal). However, not all 
Member States have decreased their EMTRs. No relevant tax changes during the 
period 1998-2001 can be reported for five Member States (Belgium, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden).61 Three Member States (Finland, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom) have even increased the EMTR. 
However, these increases are, in general, negligible and can be attributed to a 
minor increase of local taxes (e.g. real estate tax in the Netherlands) or the 
reduction of a generous first year allowance for certain investment (United 
Kingdom). Indeed, it was only Finland which increased the taxes explicitly by 
rising the corporation tax rate from 28% to 29%. 
 
 The dominant trend in the tax reforms has been a lowering of the statutory tax 
rates on profits. This has been seen in eight out of 15 Member States. As in 
earlier periods not covered by this report, the lowering of the tax rates was 
combined with extensions of the tax base, in particular with a cut back of the 
depreciation rules. However, the broadening of the tax base was not the only 
measure that was taken to finance the revenue losses which were caused by the 
lowering of the tax rates. In addition, many Member States have changed their 
corporation tax systems. There is an obvious trend away from imputation 
                                                     
58 The assumptions are summarised in Table C.1. 
59 The reader should be aware that the EMTRs recalculated for the year 1998 – although they use 
the same tax variables – are not exactly the same as in the previous Baker & McKenzie report 
(1999). This is, above all, attributable to our new assumptions for the inflation rate. In this 
report, we use as an inflation rate 2% instead of 1.1%. Since the advantage from deducting 
interest with its nominal is rising, debt-financing bears a lower effective tax burden. Therefore, 
EMTRs for the year 1998 in this report tend to be lower than in the previous report. This can 
also affect the country ranking. 
60 More detailed results for each period are presented in Tables A.C.16 – A.C.19 of Appendix C. 
61 The governments of Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg have already announced tax reforms for 
2001 and subsequent years. However, these proposed tax changes have not become effective by 
the time this report was written. 
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systems towards shareholder relief systems.62 Within the period of time 
considered here, Germany, Ireland and the UK have abolished their imputation 
systems. From the perspective of a multinational investor, the type of a 
corporation tax system is, in general, not relevant. Since, apart from a few 
exceptions,63 relief for corporation tax is only granted to domestic shareholders 
and, moreover, this analysis is restricted to the effective tax burden of 
corporations, the effects of the corporation tax system on the EMTR are not 
considered. However, what is clear from the trend which was just explained 
briefly, is, that Member States try to strengthen the international 
competitiveness of their tax system by cutting back advantages of their resident 
tax payers. 
 
Table C. 12: Summary of the most important tax reform since 1998 
Austria: Reduction of corporation tax rate from 34% to 25% on deemed profits that can be 
attributed to the increase of equity capital 
Denmark: Reduction of corporation tax rate from 34% to 32% and to 30%, reduction of 
declining-balance depreciation on machinery from 30% to 25% 
Finland: Increase of corporation tax rate from 28% to 29%, reduction of declining-balance 
depreciation on machinery from 30% to 25%, minor increase of real estate tax 
France: Reduction of corporation tax rate from 41.67% to 40%, 37.77% and to 36.43%, 
reduction of coefficient of declining-balance depreciation by 0.25%, further reduction of "taxe 
professionnelle" did not enter the calculations, since the relevant of the “taxe professionnelle” is 
not included in the model anyway 
Germany: Reduction of corporation tax rate from 45% to 40% and to 25%, abolition of reduced 
corporation tax rate on distributed profits, reduction of declining-balance depreciation on 
machinery from 30% to 20%, reduction of straight-line depreciation on buildings from 4% to 
3%, minor increase of average tax rate of local trade tax, abolition of full imputation system and 
introduction of a shareholder relief system 
Greece: Reduction of corporation tax rate from 40% to 37.5%, reduction of final tax rate on 
interest receipts of a corporation 20% to 15% 
Ireland: Reduction of corporation tax rate from 32% to 28%, 24% and to 12.5%, abolition of 
partial imputation system and introduction of a classical system 
Netherlands: Minor increase of real estate tax 
Portugal: Reduction of corporation tax rate from 34% to 32% 
United Kingdom: Reduction of corporation tax rate from 31% to 30%, reduction of first year 
allowance for investment in machinery, abolition of partial imputation system and introduction 
of a shareholder relief system 
 
Table C.12 summarises the most important tax reform during the period 1998-
2001. With respect to the degree of the reduction of the EMTR and with respect 
to systematic considerations, the reforms in Austria, Germany and Ireland seem 
to be the most important ones. 
 
                                                     
62 See Chapter B for a more detailed analysis and for a classification of the different corporation 
tax systems. 
63 For example, US-investors are granted a partial tax credit for investments in the United 
Kingdom. 
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Ireland has gradually reduced the corporation tax rate by more than 60% from 
32% to 12.5%. Although the tax rate of 12.5% will not become effective before 
2003 it was already considered for the year 2001 in this report. As a 
consequence, the Irish EMTR has declined from 20.59% (1998) to 9.43% (2001) 
(see Table C.13). Due to this significant reduction of the EMTR of 54.28%, 
Ireland could improve by nine positions in the country ranking from the eleventh 
to the second place. This is by far the highest improvement of all countries. 
 
A closer look at the types of assets and sources of finance reveals, that the 
EMTRs for all five investments as well as for the two forms of equity-financing 
– new equity and profit retention – were reduced. By contrast, the reforms have 
increased the EMTR for debt-financing.64 Therefore, a considerable lower 
statutory tax rate on profits not only reduces the effective level of company 
taxation but also the dispersion between the different forms of finance, since it 
cuts back the advantages of interest deduction and debt-financing respectively. 
 
Table C. 13: Effective Marginal Tax Rates 1998-2001 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Country EMTR Ranking EMTR Ranking EMTR Ranking EMTR Ranking
Austria 24.09 13 24.09 13 18.25 7 18.25 7 
Belgium 18.89 6 18.89 7 18.89 9 18.89 10 
Denmark 20.33 9 19.40 10 19.40 11 18.81 9 
Finland 16.72 4 17.24 4 18.09 5 18.09 5 
France 32.83 15 31.90 15 30.65 15 30.11 15 
Germany 28.81 14 28.03 14 28.03 14 25.20 14 
Greece 9.37 1 6.46 1 6.46 1 6.76 1 
Ireland 20.59 11 18.35 6 16.08 4 9.43 2 
Italy 13.74 2 13.74 2 13.74 2 13.74 3 
Luxembourg 18.98 7 18.98 8 18.98 10 18.98 11 
Netherlands 20.60 12 20.60 11 20.60 12 20.67 12 
Portugal 19.15 8 19.15 9 18.15 6 18.15 6 
Spain 18.30 5 18.30 5 18.30 8 18.30 8 
Sweden 15.73 3 15.73 3 15.73 3 15.73 4 
United Kingdom 20.56 10 20.83 12 20.83 13 20.83 13 
EU-Average 19.91  19.45  18.81  18.13  
Standard deviation 5.46  5.64  5.35  5.41  
 
 The tax reform in Austria in 2000 has introduced the concept of a dual income 
tax. According to this concept, a statutory corporation tax rate of 25% instead of 
the standard rate of 34% is levied on deemed profits that are attributed to the 
increase of equity capital of an Austrian company.65 Since equity-financing has 
                                                     
64 The EMTR for equity-financing decreases from 34.47% to 14.62%. By contrast, the EMTR for 
debt-financing increases from –5.78% to –0.43%. See Tables A.C.16 – A.C.19 of Appendix C. 
65 See Chapter B for more details about the Austrian dual income tax. 
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a high weight in the sources of finance in our model66 and relief for interest 
deduction in the case of debt-financing is still granted at the standard tax rate of 
34%, the total reduction of the EMTR in Austria amounts to 24.24% - from 
24.09% in 1998 to 18.25% since 2000. In the country ranking, Austria improved 
its position from thirteenth to seventh place. Following Italy (since 1998), 
Austria is the second EU Member State which has introduced a type of dual 
income taxation that explicitly favours equity-financing. Since there are only 
two Member States applying such a tax regime it seems too early to talk about a 
trend in this respect. 
 
 Since many elements of the tax regime were changed at once, the German tax 
reform which became effective on January 1, 2001, is also an important reform. 
The full imputation system – in force since 1977 – was abolished and a 
shareholder relief system was introduced. Under the new corporation tax 
system, only half of the dividends are subject to personal income tax at the 
shareholder's level. This change of the corporation tax system, however, has no 
effect on inbound investments to Germany. In addition to the corporation tax 
system, both the level and the structure of the corporation tax rate were 
changed. The split-rate structure that distinguished between retained profits 
(40%) and distributed profits (30%) was abolished and a lower single tax rate 
(25%) was introduced. Since the tax rate on retained profits was higher than the 
tax rate on distributed profits, retained profits (15 percentage points) receive a 
higher relief than distributed profits (5 percentage points). Compared with 1998, 
the relief for retained profits even amounts to 20 percentage points, since by that 
time the relevant tax rate was 45%. Although the 25% corporation tax rate is the 
second lowest within the EU, the solidarity levy of 5.5% and the trade tax with 
an average rate of 17.63%67 remain. With respect to the deductibility of trade tax 
as a business expense, the statutory tax rate on profits was therefore reduced by 
less than 20 percentage points from 56.67% (1998) to 39.35% (2001). Although 
this is a significant reduction, the tax rate in Germany is still high compared 
with EU standards. Currently, only Belgium has a higher tax rate (40.17%). 
Finally, there was a broadening of the tax base by cutting back the depreciation 
rules both for tangible fixed assets (i.e. machinery in our model) and for 
buildings. The maximum declining-balance rate for tangible fixed assets was 
reduced from 30% to 20%. This is the lowest rate within those EU Member 
States allowing the declining-balance method.68 For buildings, the straight-line 
depreciation was reduced from 4% to 3%, which is the second lowest rate within 
the EU.69 
 
                                                     
66 The combined weight for new equity (10.08%) and retained earnings (55.45%) amounts to 
65.53%. 
67 Applying a standard tax coefficient (Hebesatz) of 428%. 
68 See Table A.A.7 of Appendix A. 
69 Spain also applies a rate of 3%, the rate in the Netherlands (2.5%) is lowest. See Table A.A.6 of 
Appendix A. 
Baker & McKenzie 
 70
 Altogether, as can be seen from the results in Table C.13, the overall EMTR of 
the German corporation during the period 1998-2001 decreased. However, there 
is only a minor reduction from 28.81% (1998) to 25.2% (2001). As a result, 
Germany cannot improve in the country ranking and still is on last but one 
position. A more detailed analysis of the results presented in Tables C.16-C.19 
of Appendix C reveals, that not all investments can take advantage from the 
reforms. Since the effects of the tax rate reductions are more than compensated 
for by the broadening of the tax base, the EMTR for machinery increases from 
21.39% (1998) to 21.83% (2001). Referring to the sources of finance, only 
retained earnings are taxed lower after the reforms. The EMTR has been fallen 
significantly from 55.06% (1998) to 38.89% (2001). But this is still the second 
highest EMTR behind France. By contrast, the other two sources of finance are 
taxed more heavily after the reforms. The increased EMTR for debt-financing – 
from –15.55% (1998) to –0.82% (2001) – can be attributed to the reductions of 
the corporation tax rate which limited the tax savings from interest deduction 
significantly. The EMTR for new equity increased moderately from 36.08% 
(1998) to 38.89% (2001) and is since 2001 – due the abolition of the split-rate 
structure – the same as for profit retention. Although the tax rate on distributed 
profits was reduced by five percentage points, this tax reducing effect was more 
than compensated for by the effects resulting form the broader tax base.  
 
 It is difficult to draw a broad conclusion of the effects of the German tax reform. 
On the one hand, the significant reduction of the corporation tax rate is a strong 
signal for investors which is also reflected by a considerably lower EMTR on 
retained earnings of a German corporation. On the other hand, the two most tax 
efficient ways of financing a German corporation bear a higher tax burden after 
the reforms. This increases the tax burden on foreign inbound investment into 
Germany if a subsidiary is financed by debt or new equity and distributes profits 
to its foreign parent company. 
 
Figure C.5: Effective Marginal Tax Rates 1998-2001 
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 As a consequence of the developments in the Member States, the EU-average 
EMTR declined from 19.91% (1998) to 18.13% (2001) (see Table C.13). This is 
considerable reduction of 8.94% in a period of only four years. According to the 
standard deviations presented in the last row of Table C.13, the variation 
between the EMTRs of the Member States did not become less, however. The 
detailed analysis of the results presented in Appendix C reveals, that on average 
all types of investment took advantage from the reforms.70 As a consequence of 
the reduced tax rates on the one hand and the broadening of the tax bases on the 
other hand, there is now less variation between the effective tax burdens of the 
different types of investment in the Member States. With respect to the sources 
of finance, both forms of equity-financing are taxed less heavily after the 
reforms. Moreover, since Germany has abolished the split-rate structure, which 
was unique within the EU, new equity and profit retention bear an equal average 
tax burden. By contrast, the EU-average EMTR for debt-financing is higher 
after the reforms. This increased tax burden can be attributed to the reduction of 
the corporation tax rates in most Member States, which reduced the tax savings 
from interest deduction. 
 
Altogether, we can conclude, that there was a trend to reduce the EMTR for 
corporations within the EU Member States. However, the effects on the country 
ranking from the highest to the lowest EMTR were only minor. Except Austria, 
Ireland and Portugal, no country could improve its position. In particular those 
Member States which did not reduce their tax burden or even increased them 
moderately, have lost some positions in the country ranking. The most striking 
result is, that countries on top of the ranking (Finland, Greece, Italy and Sweden) 
                                                     
70 See Tables C.16-C.19 of Appendix C. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1998 1999 2000 2001
EM
TR
 %
AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER GRE IRL
ITA LUX NL POR SPA SWE UK
Baker & McKenzie 
 72
as well as at the bottom of the ranking (France and Germany) remained the same. 
From a quantitative point of view, only the Irish tax reforms caused major changes. 
The Irish EMTR has fallen from 20.59% in 1998 to 9.43 in 2001 respect already 
given to 12.5% corporation tax rate which will become effective from 2003. 
Since other countries with relatively low EMTRs did not further reduce their tax 
burdens, there is, however, no so-called race to the bottom. 
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CHAPTER D 
 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 The results of the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the company tax regimes 
of the EU Member States revealed that – in general – tax regimes are designed as a 
whole. This means, that there is a particular relationship between the number of 
taxes, the tax rates, the tax bases and the corporation tax system. It is therefore 
almost impossible to explain the differences between the effective tax burdens of 
company by just one feature of the national tax regimes. 
 
 Since this report focuses on multinational investors, the corporation tax systems 
and the personal income tax regimes prevailing in the EU Member States were not 
of main concern. In most cases foreign investors – in contrast to domestic investors 
– are not entitled to a tax credit or similar relief from double taxation anyhow. From 
the perspective of a multinational investor, the most important elements of a tax 
regime constituting the effective tax burden are the tax rate, the tax base and 
additional profit and non-profit taxes.  
 
 From these three elements, the statutory tax rate on profits has in general the 
highest impact on the level of effective tax burden. The statutory tax rate on profits 
includes the corporation tax rate plus local profit taxes and surcharges. Moreover, 
the statutory tax rate on profits is most decisive for the variation between the 
effective tax burdens in case of different sources of financing. The best example is 
Ireland with its 12.5% tax rate. However, referring to the results which are 
presented in Table C.4, the statutory tax rate on profits alone cannot explain the 
country ranking with respect to the effective tax burden in any case. There are 
several exceptions from this general rule. The most important exceptions are 
 
- a relatively high level of non-profit taxes, for example in France, 
- special (low) tax rates for certain types of corporate income, for example in 
Greece, 
- special concepts for company taxation, for example the concepts of "dual 
income taxation" in Austria and Italy which favour equity capital against 
debt-financing, or 
- local profit taxes which limit interest deductibility, for example the trade tax 
in Germany. 
 
 Since, for the vast majority of the EU Member States, the effective marginal tax 
rate in the case of equity financing differs only a few percentage points from the 
statutory tax rate on profits, in normal cases the corporation tax bases (i.e. the rules 
for income determination) do not have a great impact on the effective tax burden 
Baker & McKenzie 
 74
(see Table C.6). However, the reader has to bear in mind that this last statement 
does not consider any special investment incentives. In addition, in reality, there 
exist much more complex elements of the tax bases, such as tax free reserves or 
provisions, which were not considered in the above analysis. 
 
 Finally, the effective tax burden of companies clearly depend on the assumptions 
made for the profitability of the investment as well as on the weights for the assets 
and for the sources of finance. From these assumptions, the profitability can be 
determinative in case it drops below some critical value. However, beyond some 
level of pre-tax return, the effective tax burden is not greatly affected by any further 
increases of the profitability.  
 
 Altogether, our base case makes a good assumption about the country ranking of 
the effective levels of company taxation in the EU Member States. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TAX DATA USED IN THE CALCULATIONS AS AT JANUARY 1, 2001 
 
 
 
 
Table A.A.1: Corporation tax rates and statutory tax rates (%) 
Country Nominal 
corporation tax 
rate 
Surcharge on 
corporation tax 
rate 
Local profit tax 
rate 
Effective 
statutory tax 
rate on profits 
Austria 34.00 – – 34.00 
Belgium 39.00 3.00 – 40.17 
Denmark 30.00 – – 30.00 
Finland 29.00 – – 29.00 
France 33.33 9.30 – 36.43 
Germany 25.00 5.50 17.63a) 39.35 
Greeceb) 37.50 – – 37.50 
Irelandc) 12.50 – – 12.50 
Italy 37.00 – 4.25 41.25 
Luxembourg 30.00 4.00 9.09a) 37.45 
Netherlands 35.00 – – 35.00 
Portugal 32.00 10.00 – 35.20 
Spain 35.00 – -a) 35.00 
Sweden 28.00 – – 28.00 
United Kingdom 30.00 – – 30.00 
a) Local profit tax is deductible from the base of the corporation tax 
b) Shares not quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange 
c) As from 2003 
 
Table 2: Special effective statutory corporation tax rates (%) 
Country Tax rate Case 
Austria 25.00 Deemed interest on the increase of equity capital 
Greece 15.00 Interest income 
Italy 37.00 
23.25 
 
41.25 
Interest income 
Other investment income. financed with new 
equity or retained earnings 
Other investment income. financed with debt 
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Table A.A.3: Real estate tax and net wealth tax for corporations (%) 
 Real estate taxa) Net wealth tax 
Country Nominal Effective Nominal Effective 
Austria 0.25 0.17 - - 
Belgium 1.67 1.00 - - 
Denmark 2.42 1.69 - - 
Finland 0.75 0.53 - - 
France 1.09 0.69 - - 
Germany 0.39 0.24 - - 
Greeceb) 0.00 0.00 - - 
Ireland 1.58 1.26 - - 
Italy 0.28 0.26 - - 
Luxembourg 0.75 0.47 0.50 0.00c) 
Netherlands 0.42 0.27 - - 
Portugal 0.50 0.32 - - 
Spain 0.40 0.26 - - 
Sweden 0.38 0.27 - - 
United Kingdom 2.37 1.66 - - 
a) In all countries except Italy real estate tax is deductible from the base of the 
corporation tax. In Italy deduction is allowed from the IRAP tax base 
b) Tax exempt if used by the owner 
c) Net wealth tax can be credited against liability of corporation tax resulting in an 
effective tax rate of zero 
 
 
Table A.A.4: Non-profit taxes on assets other than real estate tax  
and net wealth tax (%) 
Country Nominal tax 
rate 
Effective tax rate Asset 
Austria 
(Kommunalsteuer) 
1.02 
0.76 
0.67 
0.50 
Buildings 
other assets 
France (taxe 
professionnelle) 
3.24 
4.24 
2.06 
2.70 
Buildings 
Machinery 
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Table A.A.5: Tax treatment of inventories  
Country Inventory valuation 
Austria Lifo 
Belgium Lifo 
Denmark Average cost method 
Finland Fifo 
France Average cost method 
Germany Lifo 
Greece Average cost method 
Ireland Fifo 
Italy Lifo 
Luxembourg Lifo 
Netherlands Average cost method 
Portugal Lifo 
Spain Lifo 
Sweden Fifo 
United Kingdom Fifo 
 
 
Table A.A.6: Capital allowances for industrial buildings (%) 
 Kind of 
allowance 
Allowance rate Length of 
period 
Austria SL 4.00 ufd 
Belgium DB 
SL 
10.00 
4,78 
7 
10 
Denmark SL 5.00 ufd 
Finland DB 7.00 ufd 
France SL 5.00 ufd 
Germany SL 3.00 ufd 
Greece SL 10.00 ufd 
Ireland SL 4.00 ufd 
Italy SL 
SL 
SL 
4.00 
8.00 
4.00 
1 
2 
ufd 
Luxembourg SL 4.00 ufd 
Netherlands SL 2.50 ufd 
Portugal SL 5.00 ufd 
Spain SL 3.00 ufd 
Sweden SL 4.00 ufd 
United Kingdom SL 4.00 ufd 
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DB Declining balance 
SL Straight line 
ufd Until fully depreciated 
Table A.A.7: Capital allowances for machinery (%) 
 First period Second period 
 Kind of 
allowance 
Allowance 
rate 
Length of 
first 
period 
Kind of 
allowance
Allowance 
rate 
Length of 
second 
period 
Austria SL 14.29 7 – – – 
Belgium DB 40.00 2.50 SL 20.00 2.5 
Denmark DB 25.00 Ufd – – – 
Finland DB 25.00 Ufd – – – 
France DB 32.14 4 SL 7.07 3 
Germany DB 20.00 2 SL 12.80 5 
Greece DB 42.86 5 SL 3.05 2 
Ireland SL 15.00 6 SL 10.00 1 
Italy SL 13.25 1 SL 
SL 
SL 
26.50 
13.25 
7.25 
2 
2 
1 
Luxembourg DB 30.00 4 SL 8.00 3 
Netherlands SL 14.29 7 – – – 
Portugal DB 35.71 ufd – – – 
Spain DB 28.57 4 SL 8.68 3 
Sweden DB 30.00 2 SL 
SL 
20.00 
9.00 
2 
1 
United Kingdom DB 25.00 ufd – – – 
DB Declining balance 
SL Straight line 
ufd Until fully depreciated 
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Table A.A.8: Capital allowances for intangibles  
– specifically the purchase of a patent (%) 
 First period Second period 
 Kind of 
allowance 
Allowance 
rate 
Length of 
first 
period 
Kind of 
allowance
Allowance 
rate 
Length of 
second 
period 
Austria SL 10.00 10 – – – 
Belgium SL 20.00 5 – – – 
Denmark – 100.00 1 – – – 
Finland SL 10.00 10 – – – 
France SL 20.00 5 – – – 
Germany SL 20.00 5 – – – 
Greece SL 10.00 10 – – – 
Ireland SL 10.00 10 – – – 
Italy SL 20.00 5 – – – 
Luxembourg SL 20.00 5 – – – 
Netherlands SL 10.00 10 – – – 
Portugal SL 10.00 10 – – – 
Spain SL 10.00 10 – – – 
Sweden DB 30.00 2 SL 
SL 
20.00 
9.00 
2 
1 
United Kingdom DB 25.00 ufd – – – 
DB Declining balance 
SL Straight line 
ufd Until fully depreciated 
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APPENDIX B 
 
ECONOMIC PARAMETERS OF THE MODEL 
 
 
 
Table A.B.1: Economic parameters of the model 
Economic depreciation rate used in the calculations 
Machinery 11 years = 17.5%
Buildings 53 years = 3.1%
Intangibles 12.5 years = 15.35%
Lifetime for tax purposes where no year is specified 
Machinery 7 years
Buildings 25 years
Intangibles 10 years
Inflation rate 2.0%
Pre-tax real return 10.0%
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Table A.B.2: Proportion of total investment in each type of asset, proportion of total capital by each source of finance,  
and personnel expenditure to turnover-ratio in each industry (in per cent) 
 Types of assets Sources of finance Personnel expenditure 
 
Industry Machinery Buildings 
Financial 
Assets Intangibles Inventories Debt 
New Equity Retained 
Earnings 
to turnover-
ratio 
Manufacturing 
(base case) 17.49 12.99 38.25 1.43 29.84 34.47 10.08 55.45 25.30 
Metal Production 25.61 12.73 33.24 0.73 27.70 42.50 8.85 48.65 20.50 
Chemical Engineering 16.64 12.69 50.67 2.81 17.19 22.55 11.92 65.54 26.30 
Engineering 13.74 14.27 21.22 1.19 49.58 49.55 7.76 42.69 32.80 
Electrical Engineering 14.82 9.95 37.52 0.92 36.78 36.14 9.82 54.03 30.20 
Automotive Vehicles 22.49 14.58 34.80 0.81 27.32 28.16 11.05 60.79 24.50 
Food and Beverages 22.24 17.64 30.42 2.77 26.93 45.50 8.38 46.12 11.80 
Building and Constructions 8.08 7.35 15.60 0.18 68.79 65.47 5.31 29.22 33.00 
Commerce 10.66 14.47 20.18 1.83 52.84 68.41 4.86 26.73 8.20 
Transport 44.68 39.68 13.92 0.25 1.48 78.23 3.35 18.42 29.30 
Services Trade 7.74 17.92 48.34 4.98 21.02 58.09 6.45 35.46 53.60 
Low Tech 24.01 22.84 13.86 2.49 36.81 60.24 6.12 33.65 8.24 
High Tech 2.40 27.00 14.92 6.26 49.42 57.80 6.49 35.71 10.79 
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Table A.B.3: Weights of types of assets and sources of finance for the sensitivity analysis (in per cent) 
 Types of assets Sources of finance 
 Machinery Buildings Financial Assets Intangibles Inventories Debt New Equity 
Retained 
Earnings 
Manufacturing 
(base case) 17.49 12.99 38.25 1.43 29.84 34.47 10.08 55.45 
 Variation of fixed assets to total balance sheet-ratio (FATBSR) 
FATBSR = 9:1 45.00 45.00 3.33 3.33 3.33 34.47 10.08 55.45 
FATBSR = 1:1 25.00 25.00 16.67 16.67 16.67 34.47 10.08 55.45 
FATBSR = 1:9 5.00 5.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 34.47 10.08 55.45 
 Variation of profit distribution and debt-equity-ratio (DER) 
DER = 9:1 17.49 12.99 38.25 1.43 29.84 90.00 5.00 5.00 
DER = 1:1 17.49 12.99 38.25 1.43 29.84 50.00 25.00 25.00 
DER = 1:9 17.49 12.99 38.25 1.43 29.84 10.00 45.00 45.00 
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APPENDIX C 
 
SUMMARY OF COUNTRY RESULTS 
 
 
 
Table A.C.1 – A.C.15: 
EMTR for Domestic Investment in the Member States of the EU 
- 10% pre-tax real return 
- only taxes of corporations 
- as from 2001 
 
Table A. C.16 – Table A.C.19: 
EMTR for Domestic Investment in the Member States of the EU 
- 10% pre-tax real return 
- only taxes of corporations 
- time series 1998 – 2001 
 
 
 
Table A.C.1: Austria 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 31.56 29.36 28.24 30.01 30.01 29.64 
Retained 
earnings 31.56 29.36 28.24 30.01 30.01 29.64 
Debt 0.69 -4.62 -5.54 -2.71 -2.71 -3.40 
Weighted 
average  20.92 17.65 16.60 18.73 18.73 18.25 
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Table A.C.2: Belgium 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 29.45 41.05 27.35 40.17 40.17 37.89 
Retained 
earnings 29.45 41.05 27.35 40.17 40.17 37.89 
Debt -31.35 -11.95 -34.85 -13.43 -13.43 -17.24 
Weighted 
average  8.49 22.78 5.91 21.70 21.70 18.89 
 
 
 
 
Table A.C.3: Denmark 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 0.00 42.76 28.35 30.00 33.00 31.84 
Retained 
earnings 0.00 42.76 28.35 30.00 33.00 31.84 
Debt -51.43 9.66 -10.92 -8.57 -4.29 -5.95 
Weighted 
average  -17.73 31.35 14.82 16.70 20.15 18.81 
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Table A.C.4: Finland 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 30.79 30.53 27.35 29.00 34.80 30.67 
Retained 
earnings 30.79 30.53 27.35 29.00 34.80 30.67 
Debt -5.65 -6.01 -10.49 -8.17 0.00 -5.82 
Weighted 
average  18.23 17.93 14.31 16.19 22.80 18.09 
 
 
 
 
Table A.C.5: France 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 31.58 55.42 47.35 41.00 44.64 44.94 
Retained 
earnings 31.58 55.42 47.35 41.00 44.64 44.94 
Debt -19.09 18.42 5.71 -4.27 1.46 1.92 
Weighted 
average  14.11 42.67 33.00 25.40 29.76 30.11 
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Table A.C.6: Germany 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 28.74 41.43 36.00 39.35 39.35 38.89 
Retained 
earnings 28.74 41.43 36.00 39.35 39.35 38.89 
Debt -15.93 2.97 -5.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.82 
Weighted 
average  13.34 28.18 21.83 25.75 25.75 25.20 
 
 
 
 
Table A.C.7: Greece 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 39.95 23.23 25.89 15.00 41.25 26.16 
Retained 
earnings 39.95 23.23 25.89 15.00 41.25 26.16 
Debt -8.08 -34.83 -30.57 -48.00 -6.00 -30.14 
Weighted 
average  23.40 3.22 6.43 -6.72 24.96 6.76 
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Table A.C.8: Ireland 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 13.23 25.10 10.95 12.50 15.00 14.62 
Retained 
earnings 13.23 25.10 10.95 12.50 15.00 14.62 
Debt -2.02 11.54 -4.63 -2.86 0.00 -0.43 
Weighted 
average  7.97 20.42 5.58 7.21 9.83 9.43 
 
 
 
 
Table A.C.9: Italy 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 15.87 25.63 13.44 37.00 23.25 27.00 
Retained 
earnings 15.87 25.63 13.44 37.00 23.25 27.00 
Debt -22.24 -1.24 -28.54 -11.75 -5.00 -11.46 
Weighted 
average  2.73 16.37 -1.03 20.20 13.51 13.74 
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Table A.C.10: Luxembourg 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 27.12 38.98 30.38 37.45 37.45 36.27 
Retained 
earnings 27.12 38.98 30.38 37.45 37.45 36.27 
Debt -28.50 -9.53 -23.29 -11.98 -11.98 -13.87 
Weighted 
average  7.95 22.26 11.88 20.42 20.42 18.98 
 
 
 
 
Table A.C.11: Netherlands 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 37.24 39.03 32.80 35.00 38.50 36.22 
Retained 
earnings 37.24 39.03 32.80 35.00 38.50 36.22 
Debt -7.32 -4.57 -14.15 -10.77 -5.38 -8.90 
Weighted 
average  21.88 24.00 16.62 19.22 23.37 20.67 
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Table A.C.12: Portugal 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 37.46 33.01 31.01 35.20 35.20 34.21 
Retained 
earnings 37.46 33.01 31.01 35.20 35.20 34.21 
Debt -7.38 -14.25 -17.33 -10.86 -10.86 -12.39 
Weighted 
average  22.00 16.72 14.34 19.32 19.32 18.15 
 
 
 
 
Table A.C.13: Spain 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 37.24 37.31 28.66 35.00 35.00 34.22 
Retained 
earnings 37.24 37.31 28.66 35.00 35.00 34.22 
Debt -7.32 -7.22 -20.53 -10.77 -10.77 -11.97 
Weighted 
average  21.88 21.96 11.70 19.22 19.22 18.30 
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Table A.C.14: Sweden 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 18.39 28.10 19.74 28.00 33.43 28.05 
Retained 
earnings 18.39 28.10 19.74 28.00 33.43 28.05 
Debt -21.12 -7.64 -19.25 -7.78 -0.23 -7.70 
Weighted 
average  4.77 15.78 6.30 15.67 21.83 15.73 
 
 
 
 
Table A.C.15: United Kingdom 
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial 
Assets 
Inventories Weighted average 
Finance       
New 
Equity 26.49 44.21 30.02 30.00 36.00 33.59 
Retained 
earnings 26.49 44.21 30.02 30.00 36.00 33.59 
Debt -13.59 11.74 -8.54 -8.57 0.00 -3.44 
Weighted 
average  12.67 33.02 16.73 16.70 23.59 20.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A.C.16: Effective Marginal Tax Rates in the EU Member States – base case – types of assets – sources of finance – overall – 1998 
 Average for each type of asset Average for each source of finance  
Country Intangibles Buildings Machinery 
Financial 
Assets Inventories New Equity 
Retained 
Earnings Debt 
Overall 
average 
Austria 27.27 23.15 22.43 24.63 24.63 38.55 38.55 -3.40 24.09 
Belgium 8.49 22.78 5.91 21.70 21.70 37.89 37.89 -17.24 18.89 
Denmark -21.31 33.58 13.27 18.73 22.73 35.36 35.36 -8.25 20.33 
Finland 17.61 15.45 10.83 15.67 22.02 28.93 28.93 -6.49 16.72 
France 15.61 45.15 34.47 28.07 33.26 50.05 50.05 0.09 32.83 
Germany 14.97 28.22 21.39 31.11 31.11 36.08 55.06 -15.55 28.81 
Greece 21.88 3.71 6.01 1.44 23.37 26.69 26.69 -23.55 9.37 
Ireland 20.06 27.07 14.30 17.73 25.16 34.47 34.47 -5.78 20.59 
Italy 2.73 16.37 -1.03 20.20 13.51 27.00 27.00 -11.46 13.74 
Luxembourg 7.95 22.26 11.88 20.42 20.42 36.27 36.27 -13.87 18.98 
Netherlands 21.88 23.48 16.62 19.22 23.37 36.16 36.16 -8.99 20.60 
Portugal 23.34 17.32 15.32 20.39 20.39 36.37 36.37 -13.60 19.15 
Spain 21.89 21.96 11.70 19.23 19.23 34.23 34.23 -11.98 18.30 
Sweden 4.77 15.78 6.30 15.67 21.83 28.05 28.05 -7.70 15.73 
United Kingdom 13.11 33.29 12.50 17.22 24.38 33.89 33.89 -4.79 20.56 
EU-Average 13.35 23.30 13.46 19.43 23.14 34.67 35.93 -10.17 19.91 
Standard deviation 11.61 9.35 8.11 6.36 4.49 5.61 7.58 5.84 5.46 
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Table A.C.17: Effective Marginal Tax Rates in the EU Member States – base case – types of assets – sources of finance – overall – 1999 
 Average for each type of asset Average for each source of finance  
Country Intangibles Buildings Machinery 
Financial 
Assets Inventories New Equity 
Retained 
Earnings Debt 
Overall 
average 
Austria 27.27 23.15 22.43 24.63 24.63 38.55 38.55 -3.40 24.09 
Belgium 8.49 22.78 5.91 21.70 21.70 37.89 37.89 -17.24 18.89 
Denmark -19.46 33.26 12.45 17.73 21.44 33.44 33.44 -7.29 19.40 
Finland 17.61 15.45 13.80 15.67 22.02 29.38 29.38 -5.86 17.24 
France 15.13 44.35 33.77 27.24 32.16 48.36 48.36 0.60 31.90 
Germany 14.87 27.73 20.61 30.27 30.27 38.40 50.70 -11.48 28.03 
Greece 24.90 3.73 6.85 -9.13 26.54 27.68 27.68 -33.87 6.46 
Ireland 17.61 25.79 12.51 15.67 22.02 30.37 30.37 -4.49 18.35 
Italy 2.73 16.37 -1.03 20.20 13.51 27.00 27.00 -11.46 13.74 
Luxembourg 7.95 22.26 11.88 20.42 20.42 36.27 36.27 -13.87 18.98 
Netherlands 21.88 23.48 16.62 19.22 23.37 36.16 36.16 -8.99 20.60 
Portugal 23.34 17.32 15.32 20.39 20.39 36.37 36.37 -13.60 19.15 
Spain 21.89 21.96 11.70 19.23 19.23 34.23 34.23 -11.98 18.30 
Sweden 4.77 15.78 6.30 15.67 21.83 28.05 28.05 -7.70 15.73 
United Kingdom 12.67 33.02 16.73 16.70 23.59 33.59 33.59 -3.44 20.83 
EU-Average 13.44 23.10 13.72 18.37 22.87 34.38 35.20 -10.27 19.45 
Standard deviation 11.34 9.13 7.90 8.43 4.30 5.38 6.70 7.82 5.64 
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Table A.C.18: Effective Marginal Tax Rates in the EU Member States – base case – types of assets – sources of finance – overall – 2000 
 Average for each type of asset Average for each source of finance  
Country Intangibles Buildings Machinery 
Financial 
Assets Inventories New Equity 
Retained 
Earnings Debt 
Overall 
average 
Austria 20.92 17.65 16.60 18.73 18.73 29.64 29.64 -3.40 18.25 
Belgium 8.49 22.78 5.91 21.70 21.70 37.89 37.89 -17.24 18.89 
Denmark -19.46 33.26 12.45 17.73 21.44 33.44 33.44 -7.29 19.40 
Finland 18.23 17.93 14.31 16.19 22.80 30.67 30.67 -5.82 18.09 
France 14.49 43.29 32.52 26.09 30.66 46.11 46.11 1.26 30.65 
Germany 14.87 27.73 20.61 30.27 30.27 38.40 50.70 -11.48 28.03 
Greece 24.90 3.73 6.85 -9.13 26.54 27.68 27.68 -33.87 6.46 
Ireland 15.15 24.46 10.72 13.55 18.87 26.28 26.28 -3.31 16.08 
Italy 2.73 16.37 -1.03 20.20 13.51 27.00 27.00 -11.46 13.74 
Luxembourg 7.95 22.26 11.88 20.42 20.42 36.27 36.27 -13.87 18.98 
Netherlands 21.88 23.48 16.62 19.22 23.37 36.16 36.16 -8.99 20.60 
Portugal 22.00 16.72 14.34 19.32 19.32 34.21 34.21 -12.39 18.15 
Spain 21.88 21.96 11.70 19.22 19.22 34.22 34.22 -11.97 18.30 
Sweden 4.77 15.78 6.30 15.67 21.83 28.05 28.05 -7.70 15.73 
United Kingdom 12.67 33.02 16.73 16.70 23.59 33.59 33.59 -3.44 20.83 
EU-Average 12.76 22.69 13.10 17.73 22.15 33.31 34.13 -10.06 18.81 
Standard deviation 10.81 8.96 7.40 8.21 4.31 5.15 6.66 7.92 5.35 
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Table A.C.19: Effective Marginal Tax Rates in the EU Member States – base case – types of assets – sources of finance – overall – 2001 
 Average for each type of asset Average for each source of finance  
Country Intangibles Buildings Machinery 
Financial 
Assets Inventories New Equity 
Retained 
Earnings Debt 
Overall 
average 
Austria 20.92 17.65 16.60 18.73 18.73 29.64 29.64 -3.40 18.25 
Belgium 8.49 22.78 5.91 21.70 21.70 37.89 37.89 -17.24 18.89 
Denmark -17.73 31.35 14.82 16.70 20.15 31.84 31.84 -5.95 18.81 
Finland 18.23 17.93 14.31 16.19 22.80 30.67 30.67 -5.82 18.09 
France 14.11 42.67 33.00 25.40 29.76 44.94 44.94 1.92 30.11 
Germany 13.34 28.18 21.83 25.75 25.75 38.89 38.89 -0.82 25.20 
Greece 23.40 3.22 6.43 -6.72 24.96 26.16 26.16 -30.14 6.76 
Ireland 7.97 20.42 5.58 7.21 9.83 14.62 14.62 -0.43 9.43 
Italy 2.73 16.37 -1.03 20.20 13.51 27.00 27.00 -11.46 13.74 
Luxembourg 7.95 22.26 11.88 20.42 20.42 36.27 36.27 -13.87 18.98 
Netherlands 21.88 24.00 16.62 19.22 23.37 36.22 36.22 -8.90 20.67 
Portugal 22.00 16.72 14.34 19.32 19.32 34.21 34.21 -12.39 18.15 
Spain 21.88 21.96 11.70 19.22 19.22 34.22 34.22 -11.97 18.30 
Sweden 4.77 15.78 6.30 15.67 21.83 28.05 28.05 -7.70 15.73 
United Kingdom 12.67 33.02 16.73 16.70 23.59 33.59 33.59 -3.44 20.83 
EU-Average 12.17 22.29 13.00 17.05 21.00 32.28 32.28 -8.77 18.13 
Standard deviation 10.38 8.82 7.82 7.72 4.65 6.74 6.74 7.78 5.41 
 
